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Abstract 
This study investigates the Egyptian military’s prominence in politics in the period 1952-2011. This 
will be done by examining the political culture in Egypt, i.e. the procedures for the transfer of 
power; public attachment to civil institutions; and whether the public is well-mobilized into private 
associations. Furthermore, this study will also examine informal institutions and the rentier nature 
of the Egyptian government. This will be done through a process tracing of political and economic 
events in the 1952-2011 timeframe.  
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1. Introduction 
The recent turmoil in Egypt (July 3
rd
, 2013), that resulted in the Egyptian military arresting and 
detaining President Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is considered by some, a 
coup d’état, while others argue that the Egyptian people had gotten enough of the deteriorating 
economic and security conditions (International Crisis Group, 2013). This is evident by the massive 
demonstration against Morsi on the 30
th
 of June 2013, which was the largest demonstration since 
the 2011 uprising (Fayed & Saleh, 30 June 2013). Days before the overthrow of Morsi, the 
Tamarod (Revolt) movement had gathered over 22 million petition votes for the removal of Morsi 
(Egypt Independent, 29 June 2013), which is significantly more than the 13 million, who voted for 
Morsi at the presidential elections in 2012 (BBC, 24 June 2012). Furthermore, the Egyptian military 
justified its actions of displacing of the incumbent government with another civilian government at 
the end of a 48-hour ultimatum, by saying that the president did not meet the demands of the people 
(AlJazeera, 3 July 2013).     
If democratic standards are applied, then it is obvious that the action taken by the Egyptian military 
was illegitimate (Beck, 2013: 2). However, at the same time, the United States managed to avoid 
calling it a coup, when referring to the events that happened in Egypt (CNN, 26 July 2013). It 
should be noted that, had the United States called it a coup, then according to U.S. law they would 
have to suspend the annual aid flow going to Egypt, which amounts to approximately $1.5 billion 
($1.3 billion going directly to the Egyptian military). Hashim (2011b: 112) suggests that Western 
foreign policy for the Middle East is geared toward controlling oil, protecting Israel and fighting 
terrorism, this requires stability and not democracy. And as Egypt has been an important ally of the 
United States for the past four decades, it is understandable why the United States would avoid 
calling the recent events a coup. But is the U.S.-Egyptian alliance a contributing factor to 
democracy prevention in Egypt? And more importantly, what makes the Egyptian military such an 
important factor in Egyptian politics? These questions are at the heart of this inquiry, but in order to 
understand the recent events in Egypt, there is a need to look at the Egyptian political culture and 
how it developed after Egypt’s independence in 1952. Furthermore, the fact that General Abdel 
Fatah al-Sisi has announced his resignation from the armed forces together with his intention of 
running in the 2014 presidential elections (Kingsley, 26 March 2014), only makes the subject of the 
Egyptian military’s prominence in Egyptian politics more current and relevant to delve into.  
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1.1 Problem Area 
The Egyptian military played a pivotal role in the founding of the Egyptian political system after the 
1952 revolution, when the Free Officers overthrew the regime and forced King Farouk to abdicate. 
Out of the five presidents that ruled Egypt since then, four of them have been from the army – 
Mohammed Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. During the 
presidencies of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, the military was the ‘loyal repository of political power 
answerable only to a strong executive leadership and sure of its privileged position in the polity’ 
(Harb, 2003: 270). However, the Egyptian military experienced some changes throughout the rule 
of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. Nasser politicized the military and relied on them for unquestioned 
support, which affected its professionalism. Sadat liberalized the regime through multi-party 
elections and frequently dismissed officers who posed a challenge to his rule – in effect de-
politicizing the military – while working hard to protect the officer’s privileges and restoring its 
professionalism. And finally, during Mubarak’s rule, he complemented Sadat’s strategies of de-
politicization and professionalism with co-optation, securing himself the complete subordination of 
the military, whilst allowing them economic independence. Furthermore, the Egyptian military can 
be considered autonomous from the state, given that since 1952, Egyptian presidents have had to 
secure the military’s loyalty at any cost, in fear that they might rescind their allegiance and stage a 
coup. This fear has led to an unspoken agreement between the president and the military, in which 
as long the military’s interests and privileges are protected, then the military will remain disciplined 
and loyal (Ibid.: 289). The military’s interests include: economic independence, in relation to their 
budget but also regarding tax exemption from their vast array of businesses; and the arms 
relationship with the U.S., which presupposes that Egypt withhold their peace treaty with Israel. 
Furthermore, the privileges that the military has obtained throughout the past six decades, has 
granted it access it nearly all sectors of society reinforcing its autonomy (MacFarlane 2012; Deljani 
2012).  
Finer (2006: 141) suggests that the level of political culture of a given state is the defining factor, 
which forms the parameters of military intervention. The lower the political culture the more 
unconstitutional the methods of military intervention become. Furthermore, less resistance to 
military intervention will be experienced, the lower the political culture is. However, in order to get 
a more in-depth understanding of the Egyptian military’s prominence in politics, the concepts of 
rentier states and neo-patrimonialism will also be applied. The concept of rentier states will 
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illuminate the complex relationship that Egypt has with its foreign patrons and the importance of 
external rents for regime survival, whilst the concept of neo-patrimonialism will illustrate the 
hierarchical nature of socio-political patterns of interaction, where investment in personal 
relationships to decision makers is a way of furthering one’s own goals. It will also highlight the 
patron-client relationship between the president and the Egyptian military.   
The Egyptian military’s rejection of the principle civil supremacy – unless the president is a former 
military officer – makes it more meaningful to investigate the Egyptian military further, as there can 
be no democratic progress in Egypt until civil politics is ‘coup proof’. This is not the case in Egypt 
today, which was made evident from the removal of Egypt’s first democratically elected president 
by the military command, headed by General al-Sisi. 
 
1.2 Current Literature 
Academic literature on the Egyptian military suggests certain attributes which contribute to the 
significance of the military as a political actor. Terms such as ‘military dictatorship’, ‘military 
society’, ‘military autocracy’ and ‘officer’s republic’ have all been used by observers of the 
Egyptian military, which delineates the close relationship between the president and the military. 
But what makes the Egyptian military intervene in politics? 
The Egyptian military will go to great lengths to secure that its interests – defense expenditures, 
U.S. military assistance and economic assets – are untouched. Therefore, the military is expected to 
have a strong reaction, if a civilian government tries to impose limits on their prerogatives and 
privileges (MacFarlane, 2012: 51), or that the military will dominate the transition process in order 
to protect their privileges and indirect ruling authority (Brashear, Girgis and Kimmel, 2012: 40). 
Nassif (2013: 529) suggests that wedding the leaders of the coercive apparatus to the regime, was 
the way Egyptian ruler’s ensured survival, that is why promoting the interests of the military has 
been the hallmark of civil-military relations for the past 60 years. Others argue that the military’s 
interest lies in a strong civilianized presidency that allows it to play a quite economic role (Harb, 
2003: 289), and that a threat to the military’s corporate interests will be equated as a threat to 
national interest (Hashim, 2011: 118). 
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The Egyptian military is also viewed as a powerful political actor. It was the preeminent institution 
in the political process during the 1950’s and 1960’s, but by the 1970’s accepted a subordinate role 
in a presidential system that protected its interests (Harb, 2003: 269). MacFarlane (2012:1) argues 
that since Egypt had been ruled by military leaders since the 1952 revolution, political and 
economic authority was in the hands of the military. Furthermore, by the time Mubarak came to 
power, the military elite became wealthier and unanswerable to law, in return for their loyalty. In 
addition the Egyptian military appeared even more powerful after the coup that removed Morsi 
(Nassif, 2013: 529). Also the Egyptian military is perceived as the decisive actor during the 2011 
revolution, since they supported the protesters instead of Mubarak (Lutterbeck 2013; Axelrod 2011; 
Goodall, Ishak & Lauridsen 2011). However, Lutterbeck (2013: 46) adopts a more cynical view of 
the Egyptian military, in so far that he suggests, that siding with Mubarak under the uprising was 
untenable and the choice to abandon him, was mainly to secure its political and economic power 
within the Egyptian society. 
The aim of this thesis is to give a comprehensive view into the development of political culture in 
Egypt since its independence. In addition this study will take into account the socio-political 
patterns of interaction and foreign assistance, in order to understand the Egyptian military’s 
prominence in politics. Thus, the following problem formulation and research questions are 
adopted: 
1.3 Problem formulation 
How can military prominence in Egyptian politics be understood in the framework of political 
culture? 
1.4 Research Questions 
How did the political culture in Egypt develop after the 1952 revolution? 
What are the socio-political patterns of interaction inherent in the Egyptian society?  
What is the significance of foreign assistance for Egyptian politics?  
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2. Theory 
The purpose of this chapter is to present the theoretical framework of this study. The first section 
will present the Egyptian state from a post-colonial and neo-colonial perspective, and serves as an 
introduction to the remaining theories. In the second section Rolf Schwarz’s (2008) theory of 
rentier states will be presented, which provides an account of state-formation processes in the Arab 
Middle East and their dependence on external rents. In the third section Oliver Schlumberger’s 
(2000) theory of democratization and non-democratic transitions in the Arab Middle East will be 
presented. Schlumberger’s theory provides an account of the variables inhibiting the emergence of 
democracy or democratization in the Arab Middle East, such as the predominant socio-political 
patterns of interaction. In the fourth section Samuel E. Finer’s (1962) theory on the role of the 
military in politics will be presented, which provides an account of the concept of political culture 
and its link to military intervention.  
 
2.1 The Egyptian state from a post-colonial and neo-colonial perspective 
The modern state in the contemporary world, a concept widely used in international relations 
theory, refers to states in which certain characteristics are present, such as public institutions, public 
organizations, sovereignty and hegemony, formal monopoly of legitimate coercion, and an impartial 
bureaucracy. However, the extent of how well these characteristics are executed varies from state to 
state. Thus, within the concept of modern states, there exist developed, developing and 
developmental states. The origins of the modern state are to be found in sixteenth century Europe, 
which through imperialism and colonialism were transported to all parts of the world, most of 
which did not already have clearly defined borders. Moreover, the modern state emerged during the 
‘great transformation’ from agrarian to industrial societies, where the fundamental function of the 
modern state, became to encourage, promote and maintain the economic and social transformation 
to industrialism. That successful and effective modern states and successful economies go hand in 
hand has become a widely acknowledged phenomenon. Likewise, failed states and failed economies 
also go hand in hand. Moreover, successful economies have lead to national wealth, which is 
inextricably linked to military strength and influence which extends outside the state’s borders. In 
pursuit of industrialization modern states have used three broad models, the capitalist, socialist and 
developmental models (Leftwich, 2011: 225-227). 
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Let us take a look at the modern states of the developing world and how they came about. As 
mentioned above, through colonialism, imperial powers were able to create states in the far reaches 
of the world. The imperial powers did so mostly out of greed, rather than a genuine desire to 
develop effective infrastructure essential for the transition from agrarian to industrial societies 
(Ibid.: 230). In other words, the primary goal was extractive, not developmental. This had an 
enormous impact on the kinds of institutions – externally designed and imposed upon – which later 
formed the foundations of these states after independence. These institutions were characterized by 
being authoritarian and elitist, and were constructed in a manner, which could maintain a high level 
of extraction for the benefit of the colonizing state. However, the institutions created under colonial 
rule were more focused on the use of ‘despotic’ power at the center – though more so in areas of 
economic and strategic importance, i.e. British control of the Suez Canal – than in developing 
infrastructural power. The lack of infrastructural power has created a legacy which has managed to 
remain in most post-colonial developing states; despotic power is still pronounced in urban centers 
and is used to protect the elites who took over power after independence. Furthermore, the lack of 
infrastructural power encouraged patron-client relations between the center and local brokers, 
leading to serious constraints on the capacity and autonomy of state institutions. These practices 
became entrenched in the institutions after independence leading to their characterization as neo-
patrimonial states (Ibid.: 229-233). 
The legacies of colonialism on developing states, has lead to some pronounced weaknesses. The 
neutrality of public institutions and the independence of public organizations have been distorted by 
the effects of patronage. The result being, the emergence of informal privatization of public 
organizations; which serve to advance the private interests and clients of the heads of state, often 
long-standing civilian or military leaders. Developing states have also experienced difficulties in the 
areas of sovereignty, hegemony, and monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. Since, these states’ 
legitimacy has commonly been challenged by various groups; these states have often had 
difficulties in establishing hegemony or maintaining sovereignty. The emergence of rentier states, 
where a major part of a state’s revenue is derived from natural resources, leads to two 
consequences. First, it reduces the need of the state in being accountable to its citizens, thereby 
undermining democracy or democratization. Secondly, intense conflicts can come about, through 
groups determined to control these resources, leading to a further weakening of the central power 
and authority or in extreme cases, its complete destruction. In relation to impartial bureaucracies in 
developing states, the existence of a culture of patrimonialism, low levels of economic growth, the 
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power of special private interests, low salaries, high levels of state involvement in the economy, and 
a lack of democratic accountability all create an environment with increased opportunities for 
discretionary bureaucratic decisions. Furthermore, corruption affects the states capacity to pursue 
economic growth, undermines development and institutionalizes unfairness (Ibid.: 233-235). 
Egypt is a typical and at the same time unique example of a post-colonial developing state. In 1952 
Egypt gained independence from both British and Ottoman influence and from that moment, the 
Republic of Egypt was born. However, in 1952 Egyptian institutions were filled with legacies from 
colonialism, which contributed to institutional weakness and hence, the status of a developing state. 
As a result, Egypt was no exception in relation to the problems many other post-colonial developing 
states experienced, such as lacking infrastructural capacity, essential for the transition from an 
agrarian to an industrial society. Egyptian leaders’ attempts to industrialize, create a modern 
military and at the same time provide welfare for the masses were met with increasing dependence 
on foreign assistance. The Egyptian state simply did not have the resources needed for these 
objectives and was borrowing tremendous amounts of money from abroad. The dependence on 
Soviet and later U.S. aid and the subsequent influence that these Great Powers gained in relation to 
Egypt’s foreign and economic policies has been coined neo-colonialism (Phipps, 2012: 1233) 
In 1955 during the Cold War, Egypt gained the patronage of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union 
would provide Egypt with a liberal aid package, subsidized weapons and loans. However, the 
Soviets were not willing to support Egypt’s transition to an industrial society, as this would 
eliminate Egypt’s dependence on the Soviet Union. Even though Nasser and Sadat pursued 
industrialization vigorously, the country fought five wars in the period 1956-1973, which had an 
enormous impact on the Egyptian economy. The Soviet Union became indispensible and the 
industrialization plans were put on hold as battle preparations were prioritized (Barnett, 1992: 88-
89).       
By mid-1970 Sadat started re-orienting the country towards the West and abrogated the Soviet-
Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1976. This move which effectively aligned Egypt 
with the United States made possible the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 and the subsequent 
return of the Sinai Peninsula, which had been seized by Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
(Yapp, 1996: 228). Furthermore, the United States would supply Egypt with military aid and 
economic assistance, which so far has lasted for four decades. However, the military aid and 
economic assistance which Egypt receives, goes primarily towards subsidizing U.S. farmers, arms 
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manufacturers and corporations, amongst others. At the same time, organizations like the IMF, 
World Bank and USAID all push for removing restrictions placed on the initiatives and freedom of 
the private sector – i.e. dismantling of state subsidies and controls – as the solution to Egypt’s 
economic problems. The irony in this situation is that the USAID is itself an element in the most 
powerful system of state subsidy in the world. Nevertheless, Egypt has benefitted from 
infrastructure projects and the acquisition of advanced weaponry financed by the United States. The 
price that Egypt pays for these benefits is a dependence on imports of American food, machinery 
and technology. The amount of debt that follows with this dependence has given the United States a 
powerful position of influence within the Egyptian state. USAID has thus acquired ‘policy leverage’ 
over the Egyptian government and conducts ‘cabinet-level dialogue’ with the Egyptian government 
over macroeconomic policy. When the Egyptian government has rejected or delayed implementing 
American demands, annual funds of economic assistance have been delayed (Mitchell, 1991: 30-
33).  
The lack of infrastructural capacity needed for the transition from agrarian to industrial society 
which Egypt experienced after independence, and the subsequent dependence on foreign assistance, 
make it necessary to take into account the political economy when analyzing the political culture in 
Egypt. This will be done to get an overview of the economic challenges that the Egyptian 
government faced during 1952-2011 period, which will give an indication of the significance of 
foreign assistance for Egyptian politics.  
Modern studies of the Middle East have contributed with the notion of rentier states. Rentier states 
are characterized by an economy, which is dependent upon a substantial amount of external rents, 
accruing from the export of natural resources. In these states, the government is the principal 
recipient of these external rents (Beblawi, 1990: 87-88). Furthermore, these governments have the 
ability to expand their services, without increasing taxes. Due to the low level of taxation, these 
governments acquire independence – lack of accountability – from the population, a phenomena 
which is rarely found in other states (Mahdavi, 1970: 466-467). Schwarz (2008) provides a theory 
of rentier states, which describes some of the shortcomings of the Egyptian state, such as a weak 
bureaucracy and lack of accountability. 
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2.2 Rentier states   
According to historical studies of Europe, the act of war-making and state-making are interrelated. 
War-making was an essential component in the process of state-formation in early modern Europe 
(Ertman 1997; Tilly 1975, in Schwarz, 2008: 600), since the process in which states get ready for 
war and then the actual combating of the war requires power holders to get involved in actions that 
are usually contributing to state-making. In order to wage war, there is a need for the state to extract 
resources (taxes) from its citizens, which in turn presupposes state control that requires an efficient 
bureaucracy. War making also requires the promotion of capital accumulation, in the scenario that 
there is nothing or not enough to extract from society, which also requires a strong bureaucracy 
(Schwarz, 2008: 600-601). 
The state-making wars of early modern Europe were fought mainly for the purpose of expanding or 
protecting the states territory. Schwarz argues that the link between war-making and state-making is 
absent from most state-formation processes in the Third World, since the territories of the Third 
World states are given. This is due to an international political order that sustains existing regimes 
against internal threats and challenges (Jackson 1990; Jackson and Rosberg 1982, in Schwarz, 
2008: 601). In other words, the survival of weak states – in the contemporary world – can be 
attributed to intergovernmental institutions, such as the U.N. Furthermore, the actual weakness and 
political incapacity of ‘quasi-states’ can be contrasted to the strength and capacity of the 
authentically sovereign states of early modern Europe, which exercised effective control over the 
territories and peoples without external existence (Ibid.: 601). 
According to Schwarz, it is not war-making, but rather, abundant oil revenues that has permitted a 
degree of militarization in the Middle East, which is the main distinction between Middle Eastern 
states and the authentically sovereign states of Europe and North America. However, in the 
Egyptian case, the availability of Great Power – Soviet Union and later the United States – foreign 
assistance made it possible for Egypt to build a large military, despite the lack of abundant oil 
revenues.  In addition, the degree of militarization in the Middle Eastern states would not have been 
possible, if they had to rely on domestic resource extraction for financing (Krause 1996; Sadowski 
1993; Schwarz 2007, in Schwarz, 2008: 601). The process of establishing an efficient bureaucracy 
through war-making has therefore not occurred, and the abundance of external rents has therefore 
contributed to state weakness (Ibid.: 601). 
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In order to conceptualize the strength and weakness of states, Schwarz suggests understanding the 
state from a functional perspective. In this perspective, the state is perceived as the provider of 
public goods. The basic functions of the state are to provide security, welfare and representation 
(legitimacy), where a common challenge of modern states is to provide all three functions at the 
same time. State formation should then be seen as a continuum on a horizontal line (see Table 1), 
where the distinguishing factor between state failure and strong state is the core functions that the 
state provides (Ibid.: 601-602). 
When a re-conceptualization of the states functions happens, it is called state re-formation. This 
could, for example, be a rentier state, which due to a fiscal crisis has to cut down on welfare. In this 
case, the rentier state would have to renegotiate the classic formula of ‘no taxation, no legitimacy’, 
which would lead to the state widening its political legitimacy, and therefore affect the 
representation function of the state. Using this functional understanding of statehood will enable us 
to draw attention to where the Arab states are strong (security function), where they are weak 
(representation function) and depending on the fiscal situation of the state (welfare). The 
renegotiation of state-society relations, following a transition from one form of state to another, will 
inevitably run the risk of bringing about violent transitions (Ibid.: 602).   
Table 1. Degrees of statehood 
 
Functions 
Degree of statehood 
Strong state 
(Weberian 
ideal type) 
Reformed 
state 
(industrialized, 
post-welfare 
state) 
Rentier 
state 
(allocative 
state) 
Weak State 
(non-
Western 
state) 
State failure 
(functional 
and 
institutional) 
Security function X X X X -- 
Welfare function X -- X -- -- 
Representation function 
(legitimacy) 
X X -- -- -- 
     Source: Schwarz, 2008: 603 
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According to Schwarz, rentier states stand in contrast to other states that have to extract resources 
from its citizens, because of the abundance of natural resources, and therefore enjoy a great deal of 
autonomy. However, rentier states are considered weak states, since they do not have to rely on 
domestic taxation, which means that state-formation has not led to political accountability, 
transparency or a ‘civilization of government’ (Ibid.: 604).    
The functioning of the rentier political system depends on obtaining rents from the outside world, 
which comprises a substantial part of their revenues. Rents are defined as income accumulated 
through export of oil, gas. However, these rents are recycled to other Arab states, though 
remittances, transit fees and aid, which means that the concept of rentier state is not confined to 
Arab states with an abundance of oil. Furthermore, bilateral and multilateral foreign aid payments, 
such as foreign development assistance, economic assistance and military aid can also be 
considered external rents (Ibid.: 604).  
Schwarz argues that there are only a few strong states in the Arab Middle East, assuming that one 
can sufficiently link strong states to the level of tax collection. This is due to the relation between 
tax collection and a states bureaucracy, where the more a state relies on direct measures of taxation, 
the more the collection of taxes relies on an efficient bureaucracy and voluntary compliance by the 
states citizens. In the Middle East, the voluntary compliance is missing – mainly due to a lack of 
legitimacy – which makes states rely increasingly on indirect ways of obtaining the necessary 
revenues (Ibid.: 607). 
By combining insights from state-formation from Europe and studies on rentier states, Schwarz 
points to a particular model of state-formation. In the rentier model, the preservation of traditional 
loyalties is made possible by the abundance of external rents, turning state-formation into a 
legitimate process. The notion of ‘no taxation, no legitimacy’ in this context means, that political 
support is bought off and then material legitimacy is created. In this state model, stability is 
dependent upon an implicit social contract between the state and society, where political rights are 
replaced by state provided welfare. When citizens trust that the state will provide public welfare, 
such as subsidies on wheat or gasoline, then conformity and less resistance will be observed. But 
when citizens begin to sense that the external rents are being misused by a self-serving elite, then 
trust in the beneficial use of these rents is lost. The stability of the rentier state model becomes 
difficult to uphold, when the state is not able to provide public welfare, for example during times of 
fiscal crisis and long-term economic development is missing (Ibid.: 607). 
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According to Charles Tilly (1975), the final outcome of state-formation is the emergence of a highly 
centralized state which exercises effective control over its territory, and can therefore, be viewed as 
an institutionally strong state. A state wages war, which has to be financed through taxes, which in 
turn necessitates an effective bureaucracy and creates political capacity. Hence, there is a link 
between war-making and state-formation. Yet, in relation to the Middle East the link is somehow 
not straight forward. Many scholars have noted the decline in state power, instead of the expansion 
of the states infrastructural power (Barnett 1992; Gongora 1997, in Schwarz, 2008: 608). Schwarz 
claims that the rentier nature of Middle Eastern states distorts the process that links war-making 
with state-formation. The rentier aspect serves as an impediment in the state-formation process of 
an accountable government and for long-term development, and thereby impedes the emergence of 
a strong state, which legitimately represents its citizens through the notion of ‘more taxation, more 
legitimacy’ (Ibid.: 608-609).      
In the Middle East, the degree of rentierism then becomes a better indicator of the course of state-
formation, which as pointed out earlier is institutional state weakness. The link between rentierism 
and weak states can be characterized by two phenomena: first the representation function of the 
state is negatively affected by a high level of rentierism. Second, the welfare function is positively 
affected by a high level of rentierism. The problem with that is that it has created an implicit social 
contract, in which political rights have been substituted with state-provided welfare. Therefore, the 
likelihood for political change will increase dramatically if there are insufficient resources for the 
state and the rest of society. In this scenario, the state will have to react to societal demands and 
broaden its representative function, in order to avoid state collapse (Ibid.: 609). 
Particular structures within rentier states can be observed due to the rentier model of state-
formation. Here the allocation of rents is determined by criteria such as: loyalty, family ties and 
proximity to rulers, which leads to a reinforcement of traditional loyalties and a lack of bureaucratic 
capacity. Instead of focusing on the formal institutions, which are the focus of most development 
theories, Schwarz suggests looking at the informal institutions, since it is here were the bulk of 
transactions occur in many countries. In the Middle East, elaborate networks of patrons and clients, 
rent-seeking, informal group structures and neo-patrimonialism are all determinants of social 
interaction and decision making politics. Wasta (Arabic for mediation) is the social mechanism 
which determines allocation decisions in society, politics and economy, and should therefore, be 
seen as the ‘lubricant of the patronage system’ (Sharabi 1988, in Schwarz, 2008: 610). In this case, 
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it is personal contact to decision makers that determines how resources are allocated and how 
material well-being is secured. Furthermore, wasta also helps in highlighting the connection 
between societal norms and lack of economic development in the Middle East. Wasta as an 
economic activity entails gains in the form of allocation of resources through investments in 
personal relationships to decision makers, which fits with pre-existing social and cultural contexts. 
Rent allocation helps preserve traditional elements in Middle Eastern societies, but it creates extra 
transition costs, which hinders the implementation of economic reforms (Ibid.: 609-610). 
Due to the rentier nature of state-formation, Schwarz argues that the possibilities of external actors 
to push for full-fledged economic reform in the region are best at times of sustained fiscal crisis. 
The implicit social contract is only durable as long as there are enough resources to maintain the 
rentier political bargain, where the abundance of natural resources strengthens the state vis-à-vis 
society. An economic crisis will lead to a fundamental crisis of the state itself, since there is a close 
link between a rentier economy and a rentier political system. In this case, the rentier state has two 
options of solving the crisis: one is through austerity measures (internally directed); and the other is 
attempting to attain new sources of external rents (externally directed). If the external option is 
chosen, then the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and Western donor countries become 
increasingly important for rentier states, given that they have the potential of becoming donors or 
rent providers. Political rhetoric becomes important because the state is pursuing political 
liberalization as a strategy of survival, which will allow it to get the best conditions for a loan or 
debt rescheduling. If the internal strategy is chosen, then economic reforms are undertaken, but very 
limited in order to balance with political considerations of regime survival (Ibid.: 610-611).    
 
Discussion  
The Egyptian state can be considered a rentier state, since a substantial part of state revenues comes 
from external rents, such as bilateral and multilateral foreign aid payments, Soviet and later U.S. 
military aid, Arab aid (which is usually in the form of grants), and revenues from the Suez Canal, 
oil and natural gas. This dependence on external rents for the survival of the regime has created a 
weak bureaucracy and a lack of accountability from the government, leading to low taxes and 
welfare in the form of subsidies on basic food stuffs and gasoline. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 
was to a large extent attributed to the lack of accountability of the Egyptian government, coinciding 
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with the global economic crisis of 2008, meant that the state was unable to provide the welfare 
necessary for upholding the implicit social contract, and after a massive uprising had to broaden its 
representative function.  
According to Schwarz, social interaction and decision-making are determined by elaborate 
networks of patrons and clients, rent-seeking, informal group structures and neo-patrimonialism, 
which makes it necessary to take into account informal institutions when analyzing the political 
culture in Egypt. This will be done to understand power relations in the Egyptian state – i.e. how 
Egyptian presidents have maintained the military’s loyalty or how the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) was able to co-opt independent politicians once they were elected MP’s – which will give an 
indication of the socio-political patterns of interaction inherent in Egyptian society. 
The concept of neo-patrimonialism is an extension of Weber’s (1978) notion of patrimonialism. In 
a patrimonial system, the distinction between the ‘public’ and the ‘private’ is blurred, particularly in 
relation to the behavior of the political administration. Furthermore, instead of serving impersonal 
purposes, the exercise of public authority is taken advantage of, by the ruler and political officials 
(Weber, 1978: 1028-1029). According to Weber’s contention, patrimonial rule is legitimate, since 
the ruler and his authority are accepted by the collective, as long as authority is exercised 
responsibly, which means that the subject has the right to opt out of this relationship (Pitcher, 
Moran & Johnston, 2009: 140). However, as patrimonial systems fit better with ancient societies or 
medieval Europe, a more modern version of patrimonialism is provided by neo-patrimonialism, 
which incorporates traditional forms of authority within the foundations of modern political 
institutions, such as elections, the rule of law and impersonal bureaucracy. In Neo-patrimonial 
regimes, a formal political and administrative system is permeated by relationships of loyalty and 
dependence. Instead of performing public service, leaders who occupy bureaucratic office do so to 
acquire status and personal wealth (Clapham, 1985: 48). Furthermore, the award of personal favors 
by public officials, such as public sector jobs, licenses, contracts or projects, is the essence of neo-
patrimonialism. In return for personal favors, clients in neo-patrimonial regimes mobilize political 
supporters and refer all decisions upwards as a mark of deference to patrons (Bratton & van de 
Walle 1994, in Rakner & Randall, 2011: 65).  
Schlumberger (2000) critically evaluates the claims that there exists democracy in the Arab Middle 
East. In doing so he uncovers the neo-patrimonial patterns of interaction, which inhibit the impartial 
functioning of state institutions. Furthermore, neo-patrimonialism highlights some of the 
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shortcomings of the Egyptian state, such as a hierarchically structured society which is based on 
asymmetric relations of superiority and subordination. 
 
2.3 Democratization and non-democratic transitions in the Arab Middle East  
According to Schlumberger, in the literature on political liberalization and democratization in the 
Arab Middle East, scholars have reached contradictory conclusions as to the existence of 
democracy or democratization. Therefore, Schlumberger attempts to critically evaluate these 
processes of political liberalization. His findings show that in the Middle East, political 
liberalization has not shown any inherent changes leading to democratization. Instead, the 
incumbent regimes have used political liberalization to their advantage, by fastening their grip on 
political power, in spite of, reshuffling of elites and changed patterns of co-optation (Schlumberger, 
2000: 104, 123) 
Political transition is the systemic change from one type of political rule to another, with democracy 
being a possible outcome, although not the only one. The introduction of a phase model is one of 
the main contributions of transition theories, in which the process of transition is split into two 
phases, namely, democratization and liberalization. In an authoritarian regime, liberalization entails 
a partial and controlled opening of civic rights, but stops short of broader political participation or 
meaningful competition. Democratization of the system encompasses the downfall of the 
authoritarian regime and a subsequent establishment of democratic institutions. This phase usually 
ends with the first free and fair elections, making democratization the core of a democratic 
transition, since liberalization does not necessarily lead to any transition. Furthermore, according to 
this view, democratization is the systemic political transition from a non-democracy to a democracy 
(Ibid.: 108-109).   
Since their independence, Arab states have hardly experienced anything other than authoritarian 
political rule. Economic developments up to the 1980’s have strongly reinforced non-democratic 
rule in the region. The sharp rise in the price of oil meant that the states in the region did not have to 
rely on domestic taxation, and thus tended to be less accountable in nature. This was not limited to 
the oil-rich states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, U.A.E. or Qatar), but the region as a whole, since these 
developments led to a political-economic sub system termed political petrolism, that linked Arab 
states together in terms of unconditional budgetary support and remittances, to name a few. The 
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consequence of this was that the state became the largest economic agent and became positioned 
autonomously above domestic society as the distributor of resources. There was little threat to the 
incumbent regimes as long as political elites were able to provide public welfare, jobs, education 
etc. However, this trend ended for the oil-poor states during the 1980’s when they fell into fiscal 
crisis, with no help from the Gulf monarchies, they were not able to maintain the previous 
mechanisms of legitimacy-creating rentierism. In reaction to bread riots, Islamic resurgence and 
protests, the regimes of those states relaxed political control, i.e. political liberalization (Ibid.: 109-
111).   
Despite positive developments in the 1990’s (political liberalization), the lack of meaningful 
competition for all positions of government, election fraud and the exclusion of women from voting 
in some states, leads Schlumberger to the contention that there exists no Arab democracies. 
Therefore, he suggests that instead of claiming that some Arab states are ‘more’ or ‘less’ democratic 
than others, one should say that Arab regimes offer varying degrees of political and civic liberties. 
Lack of democracy in the region however, does not preclude prospects for democratization. In 
addition, that the process of democratization is currently taking place is the position held by most 
specialists in the region. These scholars split into two views: some argue that a strengthened civil 
society will trigger a systemic transition to democracy, and others predict the arrival of democracy 
in the case of an economic transition to a market order (Ibid.: 111-113). 
Many scholars claim that a flowering civil society will lead to the demise of authoritarianism. The 
argument here is that the political liberalization will widen the public sphere making it possible for 
various associations and NGO’s to develop and pursue their interests, which is conducive to the 
development of greater pluralism. Also economic liberalization will strengthen private sectors and 
its institutions, with the end result being, the existence of aggregate interests that have the potential 
of putting an end to the authoritarian status quo (Ibid.: 113). 
Schlumberger proposes to discuss some of the features that shape Middle Eastern social fabric, as it 
will be useful when assessing the status of Arab civil society. He claims that Arab socio-political 
systems are characterized by asymmetric relations of superiority and subordination – neo-
patrimonial political rule. In this context, social status and material well-being is secured by 
personal contact to political decision makers, rather than labor or merit, which is conceptualized as 
wasta (Arabic for intercession). Domestic rent-seeking by individuals and groups parallels the 
state’s international rent-seeking behavior. Another major characteristic of Arab societies is group 
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structures, which Schlumberger claims are largely informal. In this environment, institutions 
function differently from those in the West, since they are penetrated by patrimonial ties, the wasta 
mechanism and patronage networks. Also, the personal closeness of an institutions leader to 
political decision makers determines their success (Ibid.: 114-115).  
Keeping in mind the fact that Arab regimes have a powerful impact in almost every aspect of social 
life, Schlumberger ponders whether there is any civil society in the Middle East that fit with the 
requirements sketched out by Mustapha al-Sayyid (1994). Here he asserts that there are no 
organized opposition groups strong enough to pose a challenge to regime politics and press for 
more liberties, since neo-patrimonial social structures have created hierarchically structured 
societies, in which the rent-seeking behavior leads a setting in which personal contact to rulers 
guarantees well-being (Ibid.: 115-116). In relation to Egypt, both Dodge (2012: 7) and Freedman 
(2011: 39) are in line with Schlumberger on this point, but add to it, that by the end of the 2000’s 
the states inability to provide the needed welfare to sustain the ‘implicit social contract’ and the 
unequal access to government resources created constituencies of dispossessed and resentful. This 
gave opposition movements the extra kick needed to unite and bring down Mubarak’s regime.   
According to Schlumberger, only three groups have the possibility and capacity to become serious 
opposition groups; the national bourgeoisie, the secular democratic opposition and the Islamic 
opposition. However, the national bourgeoisie and the Islamic opposition do not offer democracy as 
an alternative to authoritarianism, while the secular opposition movements do not pose a challenge 
to the incumbent regime in any Arab country. Furthermore, only the Islamic opposition is capable 
of countervailing the states power and interference in the creation of autonomous socio-political life 
(Ibid.: 116). Although this is a pre-Arab Spring analysis, it still holds true that none of the three 
groups alone are serious opposition groups to the states power in Egypt, as was shown by the 2011 
uprising where all opposition groups and labor movements had to unite in order to succeed in 
removing Mubarak.  
Civil society as the driving force leading to democratization in a given state, would be possible if 
civil society demonstrates independence from the state, through a process of political liberalization, 
which results in dynamics that cannot be controlled by the state. Nevertheless, Schlumberger claims 
that no Arab regime has allowed political liberalization to grow beyond control and move towards 
democratization, rather, they have moved towards de-liberalization. Therefore, the state is firmly in 
control leaving civil society in no position to exert pressure and impose reforms (Ibid.: 116-117). 
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Schlumberger argues that the hierarchical socio-political fabric in the Middle East is hardly 
compatible with the characteristics associated with the concept of civil society, namely, 
independence and autonomy. Furthermore, transition to democracy is unlikely to happen in political 
systems in which neo-patrimonial socio-political relations exist. Therefore, political liberalization 
becomes a ‘survival strategy’ by the regimes, rather than a process initiated from below leading to 
systemic transformation towards democratization (Ibid.: 117). 
The second view offered by scholars is that an economic transition to a market order will lead to 
democracy. That economic liberalization and democratization should go hand in hand, is the 
wisdom from Anglo-American political science, where a market economy is a precondition for 
democratic institutions. The fact that during the 1980’s and 1990’s economic liberalization was 
paralleled by political liberalization in the Middle East, has led many scholars to believe in the 
liberal argument of the conduciveness of market economies to democratic political systems. In this 
context, Schlumberger argues that the relevant questions are therefore, whether economic 
liberalization leads to market economies? And if it does, will a market economy be a stepping stone 
for further democratization? (Ibid.: 118-119). 
According to Schlumberger, three components of market economies need to be highlighted. First, 
competition has been stressed as a necessary element of a market economy, given that the greatest 
threat to an economy is the concentration of power in the hands of one entity – a monopoly. Hence 
there is a connection between liberty and competition. Second, a predictable system of law is 
required in order to ensure property rights and contract security. Therefore, in order for a market 
economy to emerge and survive in the Middle East, an institutional check is needed, since markets 
are not neutral or non-political realms, they too suffer from the predominant socio-political patterns 
of patronage networks, societal rent-seeking and patrimonial leadership. Third, the public vs. 
private dichotomy, is according to Schlumberger insufficient in explaining the inefficiency of Arab 
economies, and argues that excessive use of wasta is the main problem. According to economic 
theory, the organization that provides economic freedom will at the same time provide political 
freedom, since it separates economic power from political power. This is not the case in the Arab 
world, where economic and political elites are helping further each other’s interests, instead of 
making sure that the rules are not circumvented. Therefore, competition is ruled out in the Arab 
world, as there are no open markets and an equitable use of laws (Ibid.: 119-121). 
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The economic liberalization of the 1990’s has reinforced the neo-patrimonial patterns of informality 
and cronyism, due to the forging of alliances between economic and political elites, and this denies 
the emergence of market economies. These tendencies therefore, tend to derail reform efforts that 
parallel the political realm, where liberalization is a façade and elitist interests find ways of 
circumventing serious competition and the rule of law. On the basis of the above mentioned, 
Schlumberger concludes that the correlation between market economies and their conduciveness to 
democratization is irrelevant in this context, since competition based market economies do not exist 
in the Middle East (Ibid.: 122).     
Schlumberger contends that there are no signs of democratization in the Middle East, even though 
there has been structural transformation. Furthermore, in the case of a political transition in the 
Middle East, one can conceive of other outcomes than democracy. According to Schlumberger, the 
predominant socio-political pattern of interaction is the main variable, denying the process of 
democratization and democracy in the foreseeable future. Instead, the outcome of a political 
transition is unknowable, and that a transition to a non-democracy is more likely. Therefore, our 
view towards non-democracies needs to be reviewed and differentiated, in order to account for the 
growing systemic diversity of non-democracies. There is also a need characterize the countries 
where change is evident, but have not yet embarked upon democratization. Furthermore, this 
typology must accommodate the countries in which non-democratic regimes are consolidating after 
having interrupted the process of democratization, as in the case of a coup (Ibid.: 123-124). 
According to Schlumberger, there are many paths of change, which do not lie in between the two 
poles of ‘democratic transition’ and the ‘breakdown of democratic regimes’, and that transitions 
from non-democracies to non-democracies constitutes a somewhat ‘black hole’ in academic 
research regarding processes of change. Partial systemic changes of little importance have been 
implemented in oil-rich Gulf monarchies, who, still posses the means of maintaining their 
traditional mechanisms of legitimacy creation. In the oil-poor states or presidential republics, 
changes in elite behavior and composition, have led to political changes that have the potential to 
lead to systemic changes. In this context private entrepreneurs have gained formal and informal 
access to political decision makers and are therefore to be counted among the political elites (Ibid.: 
124-125). 
No signs of democratic transition or breakdown of democracy are evident in oil-poor states, where 
liberalization and de-liberalization will continue to occur as temporary phenomena. The direction, 
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in which the oil-poor states will move towards, depends to a great extent on the fiscal situation. In 
the past liberalization was a means of setting off decreasing legitimacy, as a response to a shortage 
of resources/external rents, but the problem is the rather narrow functionality of such a strategy, 
which has already reached its limit in countries like Egypt. Therefore, Schlumberger anticipates 
regimes, which have an increasingly pro-western external orientation, and economic systems with a 
more liberal appearance and a dominant private sector, although not market economies. Further, he 
predicts that these regimes will have institutionalized mechanisms of public opinion gathering, 
which will function as an early warning system against dissenting citizens. These non-democratic 
political systems will serve as the modern alternative for democratic political systems (Ibid.: 125). 
 
Discussion  
That informal institutions pervade the Egyptian political scene can be exemplified by the way 
Egyptian presidents have kept the military loyal. By providing them with privileges in the form of 
lucrative post-retirement jobs, increased pay and continuous supply of advanced weaponry, to name 
a few, Egyptian presidents have maintained the military’s loyalty by ensuring that they have a direct 
stake in the presidents rule. Furthermore, electoral fraud, corruption and co-optation by the NDP 
during Sadat’s and Mubarak’s presidencies further reinforce the existence of informal institutions. 
The economic reforms undertaken by the Egyptian government during the 1990’s and 2000’s, 
caused a decline in subsidies, which increased the grievances of an already impoverished population 
and added to the wealth of a small network of elites with connections to the president. The 
economic grievances endured by the majority of Egyptians together with a lack of accountability 
from the Egyptian government, was amongst the reasons behind the 2011 uprising.    
In 1952, the Free Officers transformed Egyptian politics and directed it towards direct military rule. 
How the Free Officers managed to do so, can be attributed to the level of political culture in Egypt. 
Finer (1962) puts forward a framework that links the level of political culture to the parameters of 
military intervention. 
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2.4 The role of the military in politics 
Samuel E. Finer’s influential book on civil-military relations was published in 1962 and still holds 
considerable relevance for military scholars of the contemporary world. Through his theoretical 
paradigm, Finer sketches out military intervention in politics, by citing several examples of military 
intervention throughout history. In doing so he explains why, how and when the military intervene 
in politics. His theoretical paradigm will be employed to examine the political culture – the level of 
public attachment to civil institutions – in Egypt in the period 1952-2011. Furthermore, by applying 
Finer’s theory to the Egyptian case, the nature of the civil-military relations in Egypt will be 
illuminated, leading to a conclusion regarding whether Egypt can still be considered a military 
regime, and if so, what kind? Finer asserts, that Egypt after 1952 was a military regime of the direct 
quasi-civilian type, in which the military rules, but it does so under the appearance of civilian 
support, such as a plebiscite in which the military assumes power. In such cases, the military rulers 
denounce their positions as military personnel and become active politicians (president, ministers 
etc.). According to Finer, despots tend decorate the official label for the political system which they 
have created, that is why the Egyptian political system was labeled ‘presidential democracy’ by 
Nasser himself (Finer, 2006: 242). A little more than sixty years have passed since the Free Officers 
removed the civilian government together with the Monarch and then supplanted them with their 
own military dominated government, yet the Free Officers legacy still lives on as the military is still 
a prominent force in Egyptian politics. 
Military intervention in politics is not unusual. Militaries have intervened in the politics of a wide 
number of countries and continue to do so. They do so persistently in the same countries, over and 
over again. A distinctive kind of regime is then a regime of military prominence or direct military 
rule, and the military as an independent political force is a distinctive phenomenon. According to 
Finer, the political advantages of the military vis-à-vis civilian groupings are overwhelming; they 
are the most highly organized association in the state and they have a near-monopoly on all 
effective weapons. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that civilian control of the military is 
‘natural’. Rather, one should ask why the military should not intervene in politics. However, 
militaries do have political weaknesses, such as being technically unable to administer anything 
other than primitive communities, and they lack a legitimate right to govern (Ibid.: 4-14).  
There are certain motives inhibiting and disposing the military from intervening in politics. Let us 
start with the inhibiting motives. Military professionalism inhibits the military from intervening, 
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since they will be too preoccupied with technical military tasks and less involved in policy issues 
that do not affect them. However, Finer maintains that this is not enough, since professionalism may 
have the opposite effect, for example the military might fear that the civilian government will cut 
down on the military budget, thereby affecting the strength of the military. Therefore, the military 
must be professionalized, whilst accepting the principle of civil supremacy, in order to stay out of 
politics (Ibid.: 23-25). In contrast, the motives disposing the military to intervene are many, and 
range from the manifest destiny of the soldier’ – the providential mission of the soldiers as saviors 
of their countries – to national interest. Another kind of motive is the sectional interest, here we 
find motives such as class interest and regional interest, in which the military is drawn from or 
associated to a specific class or region, which makes intervention more likely if the government is 
from a different class or region. Also corporate self-interest of the armed forces and individual self-
interest may dispose the military to intervene (Ibid.: 32-58). However, motive is not enough, there 
needs to be an opportunity to intervene. Opportunities can arise from an increased civilian 
dependence on the military, as during times of war for instance. Other opportunities arise as an 
effect of domestic circumstances such as, overt crises, latent crises or power vacuums. The 
popularity of the military also constitutes an opportunity to intervene. When confidence in 
politicians and civil processes declines, it is likely to increase the popularity of the military. With 
the authority of the civilian government weakened, it becomes easy prey for military intervention 
(Ibid.: 72-82).  
The opportunity for intervention is more likely, in societies where the public attachment to civil 
institutions is weak or declining. This leads to an increased likelihood that the military intervention 
will be successful, since the public is less inclined to resist. The level of public attachment to civil 
institutions is termed political culture. According to Finer, the level of political culture is a 
determinant for the array of options, available for the military to intervene in politics. There are four 
levels of political culture: mature, developed, low and minimal political culture. The way, in which 
Finer assesses the level of a given country’s political culture, is threefold. First, does there exist, 
wide public approval for the procedures for transferring power, and a belief that there exists no 
legitimate power exercised in violation of these procedures? Second, does there exist, a widespread 
recognition of sovereign authority, and who or what constitutes it, together with the belief that no 
other persons or center of power is legitimate? And lastly, is the public well-mobilized into private 
associations? In other words, do we find labor unions, political parties, cohesive churches etc.? 
Thus, a country’s political culture is high (mature political culture) when there exists a ‘political 
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formula’, in which a ruler’s claim to govern and be obeyed is generally accepted. There exists a 
wide consensus in relation to, the complex of civil procedures and organs which constitute the 
political system, which are recognized as being authoritative. Lastly, there is a strong and 
widespread public involvement and attachment to these civil institutions (Ibid.: 87). Countries with 
a developed political culture have well organized associations and highly developed civil 
institutions and procedures. Yet, disputes occur in relation to the transfer of power and who 
constitutes the proper authority (Ibid.: xvii, 89). Low level of political culture can be found in 
countries, where the public attachment and understanding of political institutions is very limited, 
leading to a public which is weakly organized. Disputes arise in relation to the institutions and 
procedures of the regime (Ibid.: 89). In the countries with minimal political culture, the public view 
on what constitutes legitimate politics hardly exists and questions of legitimacy and consensus are 
irrelevant. Furthermore, a characteristic of countries with a minimal political culture is that political 
issues are decided by force or threat of force. There exists people who hold political ideas and are 
willing to act upon them, but they are too few and too scattered and therefore can be considered 
absent (Ibid.: 129-130). According to the listed characteristics of each level, legitimation of military 
rule then becomes unobtainable in countries of mature political culture, resisted in countries of 
developed political culture, fluid in countries of low political culture and unimportant in countries 
of minimal political culture (Ibid.: 89). 
The level of political culture, in turn, forms the parameters for the level of military intervention. 
The lower the political culture, the more unconstitutional the methods of military intervention 
become. The four levels of military intervention are: influence, blackmail, displacement of a 
civilian government and supplantment of a civilian government. Influence is typically applied in 
countries of mature and developed political cultures. However, the dividing line between influence 
and blackmail is a thin one. Influence through the normal constitutional channels is not the case, 
since the military have both a right and a duty to persuade the government to their point of view, 
just like any other department of civil administration. But when military leaders are colluding with 
or in competition with the civilian government, and therefore, threaten to apply some sort of 
sanction if their advice is not heard, then influence comes to resemble blackmail. A case in point 
would be, if the military threaten to create political difficulties for the government, this could be 
considered the maximum limit of military influence, but in other circumstances this could be 
considered blackmail (Ibid.: 90, 141-146). Blackmail is the form of intervention usually undertaken 
in countries of developed or low political cultures. Blackmail is used by military officers to 
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intimidate or threaten politicians into succumbing to their demands. Threats can take the form of 
non-cooperation with or violence towards the civilian government. This form of intervention clearly 
violates constitutional considerations, in so far, that military subordination to the civilian 
government is expected and enforced, as in countries of mature political cultures (Ibid.: 141-148). 
The most severe forms of military intervention are displacement and supplantment of civilian 
governments, which are typically used in countries of low or minimal political cultures. In this form 
of intervention the military replaces the incumbent civilian government with another civilian 
government of its choosing (displacement). In the extreme version of displacement the military 
removes the civilian government and establishes military control (supplantment), i.e. they install 
military personnel in civilian positions (parliament, ministries or even embassies). This kind of 
intervention happens in situations where the military threatens to revolt or refuses to defend the 
government against civil disorder or external enemies. It can also happen through the use of 
violence, such as a coup (Ibid.: 151-163).    
The level of political culture coupled with the level of intervention, then gives us an idea of the kind 
of military regime, which the military – if they intervene successfully – will direct a country to. 
There are three broad result possibilities: indirect, dual and direct military rule. 1) Indirect military 
rule can be further split into indirect-limited military rule and indirect-complete military rule. 
Indirect military regimes are regimes in which, formally, a civilian government rules and assumes 
constitutional responsibility. This kind of regime is created when the military intervention methods 
of blackmail or displacement are successfully used on a civilian government, who then conforms to 
military demands. The difference between indirect limited and indirect-complete, is the extent to 
which the military interferes in political matters. If they occasionally exert control over the civil 
power on certain political matters it is indirect limited military rule. If they exert control over the 
civil power on all political matters then it is indirect-complete military rule (Ibid.: 164-173). 2) 
Direct military rule can also be further split into direct military rule and direct quasi-civilianized 
military rule. In direct military regimes, as the name suggests, the military assumes responsibility, 
but it may appoint a civilian government to implement its policies (direct quasi-civilianized). In 
other cases, it rules through a junta of its own members (direct). This kind of regime comes as a 
result of, the military intervention method of supplantment (Ibid.: 176-183). 3) Dual rule is 
dependent upon the army on one hand and a civilian party or civilian opinion on the other, with 
both being under the control of an oligarchy or despot. Finer suggests that this type regime fits with 
more military dictatorships, than is initially realized. As soon as an individual is elevated to power, 
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usually by first being a leader of the armed forces, this individual will become more and more 
preoccupied with the functions of government. Simultaneously, the same individual will start to 
dissociate himself from actively commanding the military and build up civilian forces on which to 
rely on. Furthermore, sometimes this kind of dual regime will be constitutionalized. Dual rule 
regimes stem from one of three levels of military intervention; they can be a result of blackmail, 
displacement or supplantment. The defining characteristic of dual rule regimes is that the military 
overtly assumes certain official responsibilities for government together with civilian forces (Ibid.: 
173-175).  
The form taken by a military regime – indirect, dual, direct etc. – is however not static, it is 
common that one kind of military regime changes into another. The changes among the different 
types of military regimes occur in a fashion which resembles a scale, in which changes can take 
place up or down this scale. The scale runs parallel with the intensity of military intervention (see 
table 2).                                       
         Table 2. Military regimes  
 
 
 
 
      
              
              Source: Finer, 2006: 18 
 
 
Discussion 
The political culture of Egypt as an indicator of military prominence is fruitful, since public 
attachment to civil institutions explains why military intervention in politics is embraced and not 
resisted. In 1952, the Free Officers transformed the Egyptian state into a Republic and appointed 
one of their own as president. Since then Egypt has been ruled by presidents with military 
backgrounds. Furthermore, when Mubarak stepped down in 2011, he handed over power to the 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (SCAF). In both 1952 and 2011, one could argue that 
there was a lack of public attachment to civil institutions, making military intervention a desirable 
outcome. This is the advantage of using the concept of political culture. However, political culture 
Indirect: limited 
Indirect: complete 
Dual 
Direct 
Direct quasi-civilianized 
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does not take into account external influence and its implications for military prominence. That is 
why political culture will be coupled with the concept rentier states, in order to understand the 
importance of foreign aid in placating the military, which was necessary as Egypt strived to become 
a regional military power after 1952. Furthermore, political culture does not take into account 
informal institutions and its implications for military prominence. Political culture examines public 
approval for the procedures for transferring power, public attachment for civil institutions and 
whether the public is well-mobilized into private associations, but stops short of explaining the 
underlying mechanisms at work when there is a transfer of power. The same goes for explaining the 
underlying mechanisms of why the public is not well-mobilized into private associations and why 
there is a lack of public attachment to civil institutions. Therefore, political culture will also be 
coupled with the concept of neo-patrimonialism, in order to understand the socio-political patterns 
of interaction, which enable the president to both maintain the military’s loyalty and ensure 
continued dominance of the political system.    
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3. Methods 
With the theoretical framework outlined, the purpose of this chapter is to present the methods of 
this study. In the first section the research design will be presented. In the second section the 
empirical data will be presented. In the third section the analytical strategy will be presented.  
  
3.1 Research design 
The research design of this study will be based on a case study of military intervention in Egyptian 
politics, where the method of process tracing will be applied. A case study is well suited for 
falsifying propositions, i.e. the theories presented above. This is so because the case study involves 
an in-depth approach which is useful for identifying ‘black swans’ – the case that falsifies a 
proposition (Flyvbjerg, 2004: 424). The time frame 1952-2011 will provide an in-depth overview of 
the Egyptian state which was created by the Free Officers after independence until the ousting of 
Mubarak. The choice of this time frame is to highlight how military rule was institutionalized, but 
also to provide an indication of the challenges which will Egypt face in the coming years. Through 
a process tracing, this study will be able to uncover causal paths and mechanisms, and assess 
specific mechanisms identified in the theories (Halperin & Heath, 2012: 172). The process tracing 
will be based on a historical overview of political and economic events in the period 1952-2011, in 
order to assess the political culture, political economy and informal institutions in Egypt. 
Furthermore, by using a case study of military intervention in Egypt and a process tracing of the 
mechanisms identified in the theories this study will test the hypothesis: that the types of military 
intervention used will give an indication of the level of political culture and the existence of a 
military regime. 
 
3.2 Empirical data  
The empirical data gathered and used in the analysis are from a variety of books, academic papers, 
scientific articles and student reports. The empirical data can be split into two categories: historical 
empirical and political theory analysis. By combining both types of data, the historical overview of 
the processes of political and economic development will be nuanced, as different sets of data will 
be contrasted. 
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The first research question: ‘how did the political culture in Egypt develop after the 1952 
revolution?’ will be answered by applying Finer’s concept of political culture. In order to find out 
what the level of political culture was in Egypt in the 1952-2011 time frame, the empirical data will 
be stripped from all information regarding: the procedures for the transfer of power; public 
attachment to civil institutions; and whether the public was well-mobilized into private associations.  
The second research question: ‘what are the socio-political patterns of interaction inherent in the 
Egyptian society?’ will be answered by Schlumberger’s theory on non-democratic transitions, the 
notion of informal institutions, and specifically the concept of neo-patrimonialism. In order to find 
out what the socio-political patterns of interaction inherent in Egypt are, the empirical data will be 
scanned for patronage networks between the president and the military; cooptation of independent 
politicians; how Egyptian presidents managed to maintain dominance over the political system; and 
how presidential succession takes place.   
The third question: ‘what is the significance of foreign assistance for Egyptian politics?’ will be 
answered by Schwarz’s concept of rentier states. The significance of foreign aid will be shown by 
examining the political economy of Egypt in the 1952-2011 time frame. Here nationalizations, wars 
and external events (i.e. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait) and their implications for the Egyptian economy 
will be highlighted, but also the importance of subsidies on basic foodstuffs and gasoline for regime 
stability. 
 
3.3 Analytical Strategy 
The structure of the analysis will be based on a process tracing of political and economic events in 
the time frame 1952-2011, where the main objective is to test the three theories and answer the 
research questions. By answering the three research questions, the foundation for the problem 
formulation will laid, which will be discussed in the conclusion.     
Examining the Egyptian military’s prominence in politics in this study with the use of a process 
tracing entails making a historical overview of the political and economic events in the period 1952-
2011. Due to the length of the chosen time frame, the analysis will be split into three parts; each 
dealing with one presidency. Furthermore, the analysis is split into three parts to provide an in-
depth look at the impact each president had on the political culture, political economy and informal 
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institutions. The first part will be about the Free Officers coup and Gamal Abdel Nasser’s 
presidency (1952-1970). The second part will be about Anwar Sadat’s presidency (1970-1981), and 
the last part will be about Hosni Mubarak’s presidency (1981-2011). Each presidency will be split 
into three parts, each tackling one research question and ending with a discussion. In each 
discussion the sum of events in that period will be analyzed by applying theory. 
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4. Analysis 
 
4.1 The Free Officers movement and Nasser’s presidency, 1952-1970  
In this section the Free Officers movement and Nasser’s presidency will be examined in relation to 
the level of political culture, informal institutions and foreign assistance. The first part concerns 
political culture, where the procedures for the transfer of power; the public’s attachment to civil 
institutions; and whether the public is well-mobilized into private associations will be discussed. 
The second part concerns informal institutions, where patronage networks will be highlighted and 
discussed. The third part concerns foreign assistance, where the significance of the rentier state 
behavior of the Egyptian government will be discussed.  
 
4.1.1 Political culture 
After being defeated in the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, a group of junior and middle ranked 
officers in the Egyptian army began to conspire against the monarchy in Egypt. These officers – the 
Free Officers – emerged for a number of reasons; rage and humiliation from their defeat in 
Palestine, distaste for the monarchy and the senior officers in the military, extreme nationalism, 
social resentment of the effendi class (ruling class with Turkish, Balkan and Circassian roots), and 
colonial influence over the monarchy together with British military presence in the Suez Canal. The 
Free Officers, therefore, plotted a coup d’état, which on the 23rd of July 1952 led to the abdication 
of King Farouk and eventually established a military government (Barnett 1992; Yapp 1996; Finer 
2006; Cook 2007 & Hashim 2011a).    
The events that followed immediately after indicate the beginning of a military regime of indirect 
rule. The Free Officers displaced the government and put instead a civilian, Ali Maher as prime 
minister, who formed a cabinet. Soon thereafter, the Free Officers proceeded to form the Executive 
Committee, through which they were able to influence Maher, and ensure the removal of senior 
officers from the military and an increase in military pay. However, they were not successful in 
influencing Maher to implement a land reform, which would have removed the landed aristocracy 
through land sequestration. As a result, Maher’s government was short lived, and by the 7th of 
September 1952 the Free Officers began arresting forty-three politicians from the old regime, 
removed Maher and installed General Mohamed Naguib as prime minister – the rest of the cabinet 
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remained. The Free Officers continued to make institutional changes, such as the decision to place 
thirty officers, one in each government department, in order to guarantee close coordination 
between military policy and administrative action (Finer, 2006: 187).   
In the period after the coup the military gradually involved itself more in politics, and by December 
1952 the Free Officers initiated a period of direct military rule. On the 10
th
 of December Naguib 
announced that the 1923 Constitution had been abrogated and that authority had been passed on to a 
transitional authority – the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) – for a three year period, after 
which a constitutional government would resume. All political party activities were suspended and 
the leader of the revolution would exercise supreme sovereignty, which included appointing and 
dismissing ministers (Ibid.: 188). In order to fill the vacuum created by the banning of political 
parties, the RCC created the Liberation Rally in early 1953, a mass based organization, which was 
mainly used to consolidate the regimes position and as a legitimizing tool for the ruling elite 
(Barnett, 1992: 82). It was also the first attempt by the Free Officers to institutionalize their regime 
(Cook, 2007: 64). Later that year, the monarchy was abolished and Egypt was declared a republic. 
Naguib became president and prime minister; Gamal Abdel Nasser became deputy prime minister 
and minister of interior, while other officers began to move into government (Yapp, 1996: 212).  
This arrangement did not last long, as by March 1954 Naguib was removed, and Nasser who had 
support in the RCC and the military took his place. The RCC continued to rule despite a lack of 
widespread public involvement and attachment to civil institutions. The decision-making process 
was restricted to a small circle by the government, who represented itself as uniquely able to 
represent societal demands. In response the Wafd party and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) 
demanded more political representation and autonomy from governmental control. This attempt to 
confront the government’s political repressions failed and the government used force against them 
and other opposition groups. After a failed assassination attempt on Nasser, the MB’s activities 
were outlawed and many of their leaders were jailed (Barnett, 1992: 82-83).  
In 1956 the RCC under Nasser’s leadership managed to institutionalize their rule, with considerable 
ease, as there were no significant opposition forces left to oppose this development. On the 16
th
 of 
January, at the end of the promised transitional period a new constitution was offered, with a 
powerful president and a comparatively weak National Assembly. The constitution was submitted 
to a plebiscite in June and the results were 99.8% of the votes for the constitution. Nasser, who had 
been nominated by the RCC for the presidency, received 99.9% of the votes. Afterwards the RCC 
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was dissolved and the cabinet ministers had to drop their military titles, in order for the regime to 
show itself civilianized. There were no independent parties only the government created National 
Union – which succeeded the Liberation Rally – was official. Members of the National Assembly 
were chosen by Nasser, and the press was nationalized and government controlled (Finer, 
2006:189).    
Political parties continued to be banned and the masses did not receive an institutionalized forum 
for influencing policies. Instead the government offered the National Union, which was a mass 
based organization like its predecessor the Liberation Rally. However, the main function was to 
choose candidates for the new parliament. In 1962 the National Union was succeeded by the Arab 
Socialist Union (ASU), but again the main function was to select candidates for the National 
Assembly and to mobilize the energies of the people. Nevertheless, these mass based organizations 
were rarely considered by the public as adequate or legitimate (Yapp, 1996: 214). 
The procedures for the transfer of power were not transparent, and lacked public approval. Also the 
public attachment to state institutions was deficient. This can be exemplified by the events of 1967. 
The disastrous defeat in the June 1967 War with Israel and the loss of the Sinai Peninsula, led to 
Nasser’s resignation and his nomination of Zakaria Muhi al-Din – Vice President and former RCC 
officer – to take his place. However, this did not last long as Nasser returned to his post, after the 
masses responded to the news by a tremendous gathering of support (Ibid.: 222). Nasser was spared 
from society’s wrath, but the regime was not. After 1967 societal dissatisfaction increased, the main 
complaints were; the military’s performance in the war, the state’s non-democratic character, and a 
general discrediting of state institutions (Barnett, 1992: 103-104). 
 
Discussion of the level of political culture during Nasser’s presidency 
The level of political culture during the period 1952-1970 can be characterized as being low, i.e. 
public attachment to political institutions is limited, the public is weakly organized and disputes 
arise in relation to the institutions and procedures of the regime (Finer, 2006: 89). One can hardly 
say that, there was wide public approval for the procedures for transferring power, and that no other 
legitimate power can be exercised in violation of these procedures. This is apparent in the way the 
Free Officers were able to stage a coup and abdicate King Farouk. Public opinion was not resistive 
towards military intervention; rather it was in support of the Free Officers. Shortly after Ali Maher 
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became Prime Minister, he was removed by the military junta. Even General Mohammed Naguib 
who was himself a member of the Free Officers was not in a better position in 1954. This indicates 
that the procedures for the transfer of power were not based on a standard political formula rather it 
was support from the inner circle of the Free Officers and the military, that both allowed Nasser to 
replace Naguib, and to become President in 1956.  
During the transitional period political parties were banned, and the government created the 
Liberation Rally. The Liberation Rally and its successors the National Union and the ASU were all 
mass based organizations. However, the decision-making process was restricted to a small circle by 
the government. These mass based organizations were mainly used for consolidating the regimes 
position and as a legitimizing tool for the ruling elite. This indicates that the public was not well 
mobilized into private associations. The mass protests that erupted after the 1967 war, where 
dissatisfaction with the state’s non-democratic character and the general discrediting of state 
institutions, indicate the lack of widespread public involvement and attachment to civil institutions. 
All this reinforces the perception that Egyptian political culture during this period can be 
characterized as low. 
 
4.1.2 Informal institutions 
The Free Officers only comprised a small fraction of the military, and from the moment they 
assumed power, they strove to control the military. During this period the political system could be 
characterized as being split into two, on the one hand was the Free Officers and their co-opted 
technocrats, and on the other hand the bulk of the officer corps and the armed forces (Hashim, 
2011a: 68). This made it imperative to control, or at the very least maintain the loyalty of the 
military since they had the capabilities to stage another coup; they possessed superior organization 
and arms. Therefore, Nasser appointed his close friend Abdel Hakim Amer as the armed forces 
commander, which ensured close cooperation between Nasser and the military. Amer kept the 
military out of politics and in return military expenditures were steadily increased, better pay and 
additional privileges were given to officers (Yapp, 1996: 213). Amer’s promotion had provided him 
with access to political power and the levers of patronage. However, under Amer, military 
professionalism declined and the military acted in essence as a political power center independent 
of the state (Hashim, 2011a: 69).   
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The patronage network between Nasser and Amer would prove to be crucial, as Nasser would use 
the military as a base for legitimacy and power. This was evident in 1954, when a series of political 
intrigues ensued between Nasser and Naguib. Naguib wanted the military command to disengage 
from politics after the transitional period and Nasser wanted to hold on to power. In terms of 
popular esteem Naguib outranked Nasser; he also had support in the Left. Nasser had support 
amongst the Free Officers, the military and the Conservatives. However, with the help of Amer, 
Nasser triumphed (Yapp, 1996: 212-214). Nasser had managed to solidify his power at the cabinet 
level (Barnett, 1992: 82), and on the 28
th
 of March 1954, Naguib was seized and demoted, Nasser 
became prime minister and the decision to maintain power affirmed. From then on all RCC 
members became cabinet members (Finer, 2006:189).  
Nasser had managed to cement his political power, and as a result he became the nucleus of a 
decision-making process, that was barely institutionalized by assuring tremendous concentration of 
power in the governmental elite’s domain. The government’s most important tool would become 
the state apparatus, where the RCC initially relied on the existing administrative network. Since this 
administrative network was staffed by the landed aristocracy, the RCC began to remove them and 
put instead trusted military personnel and technocrats (Barnett, 1992: 84-85). Hashim (2011a: 68) 
states that ‘’relying on military men in the top positions reinforced the insulation of the ruling Free 
Officers from the larger society in whose name they ostensibly ran the country. They were not 
aligned for any length of time with a social class.’’. By 1955 Nasser and the Free Officers had 
defeated all their political opponents (Yapp, 1996: 214). 
With political power secured, the RCC’s second goal was to promote economic development, by 
encouraging industrialization. However the main societal blockage to their development goals was 
the landed aristocracy (Barnett, 1992: 83). The RCC therefore proceeded with a series of economic 
measures, such as agricultural reform and sequestration of private property (Cook, 2007: 64). By 
limiting land ownership to 200 acres per person (lowered to 100 in 1961 and 50 in 1969), they 
began confiscating land from large landowners and distributed some of this land to landless 
peasants (Harb, 2003: 277). These radical strategies forced changes to the social structures of 
Egyptian society. The government accumulated more political power by getting rid of the landed 
aristocracy, and at the same time created a new ‘second stratum’ of agrarian interests, who were 
loyal to Nasser (Barnett, 1992: 83).  
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By 1956, after the end of the transitional period, the government was Nasser’s and his handpicked 
circle of military assistants. The root of the government was the military, which through the regime 
did well socially, financially and politically (Finer, 2006:189). Furthermore, the relative cohesion of 
the state apparatus only advanced this. The government’s objectives were determined by a handful 
of officials, and also the means were controlled by a cohesive, hierarchically structured and 
responsive bureaucracy and public sector. All this together, allowed Nasser to be quite proficient at 
formulating his desired policies (Barnett, 1992: 85). 
Nasser moved on to ensure state control over the economy, in order to pursue his development 
goals. The Suez War in 1957 encouraged Nasser to initiate a series of nationalizations, which would 
have profound implications for the political economy. Foreign banks, insurance companies and 
commercial agencies were nationalized. And with domestic capital’s reluctance to partake in 
Nasser’s development goals, more nationalization followed. This time National Bank of Egypt and 
Bank Misr were nationalized, effectively silencing domestic capital as important societal actors 
(Harb, 2003: 277). The perceived threat posed to the state’s control over the economy, prompted 
Nasser to respond by initiating the series of nationalizations. The result was that the government 
had centralized its control over the economy, established its prominence in economic affairs and 
undercut the private sector. Also, the state became the principal producer and owner of productive 
resources (Barnett, 1992: 94-95). 
The resources that were accumulated by the state through land sequestration and the 
nationalizations led to an expanding public sector. From 1952-1972 the public sector grew from 
15% to 48% of GDP (Yapp, 1996: 218). Nasser was rewarded by the expanded public sector in two 
ways. First, the public sector was infused with military men and technocrats, who shared the 
government’s vision, and became an instrument of political and economical control. Second, by 
controlling a vast amount of productive assets and economic surplus, the state became a dominant 
economic power base. The nationalizations and the subsequent expansion of the public sector led to 
an ever powerful state bureaucracy, which was answerable only to Nasser (Barnett, 1992: 95). 
In 1962 the most ambitious attempt to create a mass party was carried out. The ASU appeared as if 
it was organized from bottom-up, with about 7,000 basic units scattered in villages, urban quarters, 
schools and factories. Nevertheless, the supreme executive committee and its general secretariat ran 
the affairs of the ASU. The secretariat was divided into branches, where prominent leaders of the 
regime with ministerial status headed them. The ASU was more a ramshackle collection of power 
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bases than a political party. Furthermore, within the ASU there was created a small political 
vanguard, which gave the possibility of making a new power base that could rival the military, and 
compete for the succession of Nasser (Yapp, 1996: 214-215).   
Although Nasser had considerable powers, such as decision-making authority and control over the 
state apparatus, his domestic standing was subject to pressure. However, Nasser had the tools to 
maneuver through these challenges and quell societal discontent. The first tool was to distribute and 
withhold economic rewards, such as nationalizing the assets of those who represented a challenge, 
and subsidizing the standard of living of the urban masses. The second tool was the simulation of 
power sharing through the ASU. The ASU was meant to be a forum for channeling societal 
expression, but was rarely perceived by the masses as adequate or legitimate. The third tool was 
repression, which was used when the first two tools did not work, such as in the demonstrations of 
1965 and 1966, that came as a response to the economic downturn of the mid-1960s (Barnett, 1992: 
96). 
From 1967 military presence in the cabinet and state apparatus started to decline, as a result of the 
war with Israel and the loss of the Sinai. After the military defeat, Nasser began to ‘cleanse’ the 
Egyptian government, by making changes in the composition of state managers. Nasser blamed the 
military for the defeat and removed Amer and fifty other commanders. In response military and 
security chiefs tried to overthrow Nasser, but failed (Yapp, 1996: 222). The purge of officers from 
the state apparatus pleased society’s demands for justice and accountability, increased Nasser’s 
control over the opposition, and supplied the technocrats with a more integral role in the decision-
making process. Nasser continued with the purges, but now he shifted focus to the cabinet. He 
removed some officers from the cabinet, and in their place he inserted academics and civilians. The 
new government officials were willing to implement Nasser’s economic policies, which led to more 
control over the public sector and greater market discipline (Barnett, 1992: 104-105). Table 3 shows 
the increase in cabinet ministers with military background up to 1966 and the subsequent decline. 
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       Table 3. Occupational sources of recruitment of cabinet members 1952-1977 
 
a 
data missing on 1 individual, 
b 
data missing on 3 individuals, 
c 
data missing on 2 individuals.             
 Source: Cooper, 1982: 206-207 
 
Discussion of informal institutions during Nasser’s presidency 
The socio-political patterns of interaction in the period 1952-1970 can be characterized as being 
neo-patrimonial in nature, i.e. the formal political administrative system is permeated by 
relationships of loyalty and dependence (Clapham, 1985: 48). Those with the right connections – 
wasta – have the real power, not the ones that hold a higher position in the state apparatus. This was 
evident in 1954 when Nasser was able to remove Naguib due to his connections in the military and 
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support amongst the Free Officers. Also in 1956, the same connections led to Nasser’s nomination 
for the post of president by the RCC. In neo-patrimonial societies, the patron uses state resources to 
secure the loyalty of clients, and in some cases – rentier states – to secure the loyalty/compliance of 
the population. That is how Nasser secured the military’s loyalty, he promoted his close friend 
Amer to Armed Forces Commander and in return military expenditures were increased. 
Furthermore, the massive inflow of officers and technocrats in the state apparatus who were loyal to 
the Free Officers, secured the Free Officers insulation from the rest of society, in return for material 
well-being. However, patrons may also choose to use office for personal gain, such as the need to 
remove the landed aristocracy through land sequestration, in order to pursue the goal of 
industrialization. By distributing some of the sequestered land to peasants, the state created a second 
stratum of agrarian interests loyal to the Nasser. By 1956, the state apparatus was characterized by 
being cohesive, hierarchically structured with a responsive bureaucracy and public sector.  
In the aftermath of the Suez War, Nasser initiated a series of nationalizations. The result was that 
the private sector was undercut, providing Nasser with more resources for his development goals, as 
the state became the dominant economic base. The nationalizations also allowed him to expand the 
public sector, which led to an ever-powerful state bureaucracy answerable only to Nasser. After the 
1967 War, societal discontent led Nasser to make changes in the composition of state managers. 
Military officers were removed and civilians and academics who were loyal to Nasser, took their 
place. Furthermore, Nasser had managed to purge the military leadership of all opposition to him. 
  
4.1.3 Foreign assistance 
The evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal in 1954 meant that the national threat that 
Israel posed, rose dramatically (Hashim, 2011a: 70). This was due to Nasser’s pronounced devotion 
to the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egyptian support for Palestinian guerilla forces and the subsequent 
escalation of clashes between Egypt and Israel. As a result, the possibility of a second Arab-Israeli 
war increased and Nasser needed to rebuild the Egyptian army. Amin Huwaidi, former Egyptian 
minister of war stated that ‘’Egyptian leaders faced a ‘three-dimensional dilemma’: defense, 
investment for economic development, and expenditures intended to stabilize the regime. The 
difficulty is balancing the three and finding a way to limit their expenditures’’ (Barnett, 1992: 80). 
Defense expenditures climbed from 4.7% of GNP in 1951-52 to 8.4% of GNP in 1955-56 (see table 
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4), and the main concern was how to finance such military costs, while maintaining the regimes 
other objectives of political stability and investment for economic development.  
 
                      Table 4. Egyptian defense spending 1950-1976 
 
  Source: Dessouki & Al-Labban 1981, in Barnett, 1992: 81 
 
Since Egypt was a resource weak country – the economy depended heavily on the agricultural 
sector – there was little hope of extracting funds directly from the population. This would also have 
jeopardized Nasser’s political basis and incurred the citizens’ resentment. At the same time Nasser 
did not want to increase taxes on the foreign and domestic capitalist class, as this would have 
undercut his industrialization plans. Dependence on indirect taxes, characterized the state’s 
weakness, and when combined with ambitious foreign and domestic goals, the risk of a resource 
gap increased. Therefore, Nasser had to attract Great Power interest in Egypt’s future, in order to 
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overcome the resource scarcity, thereby supplementing Egypt’s economic and military capabilities. 
Through foreign assistance, Nasser would be able to shield both capital and labor from the pains of 
his expensive set of objectives (Ibid.: 86).  
Fortunately for Nasser both USA and the USSR were interested in supporting Egypt. Since Nasser 
was not ideologically inclined to choose either East or West, he had the opportunity to choose the 
side that presented the best offer. In 1955, Nasser chose to side with the Soviet Union, and an arms 
agreement was made (Yapp, 1996: 221). The agreement with the Soviets provided a liberal aid 
package, subsidized weapons and long term loans with low interest rates, where payment could be 
done in barter. Nasser had succeeded in gaining the assistance of a Great Power patron, and this 
marked the beginning of an era, where Egypt received weapons from Eastern Bloc countries and in 
return shipped enormous amounts of cotton and agricultural goods. This proved essential, since 
domestic sources could not provide for warfare, welfare and investment. However, the implication 
was that the government was borrowing rather than choosing between governmental objectives 
(Barnett, 1992: 88-89).     
On the 29
th
 October 1956, Israel launched a surprise attack on Egypt through the Sinai Peninsula 
and reached the Suez Canal banks. The following day Britain and France launched an attack with 
the ostensible purpose of separating the Egyptian and Israeli forces – nationalization of the Suez 
Canal earlier that year is argued to be another reason. Even though the situation looked very bleak 
for Egypt, through tremendous pressure from USA and the Soviet Union, British and French troops 
withdrew. After more pressure from USA, Israel withdrew under international guarantees regarding 
its right to pass through the Straits of Tiran and a demilitarized Egyptian-Israeli border. Nasser had 
managed to turn a military defeat into a diplomatic victory, and he became viewed as an anti-
Imperialist and began to involve himself more forcefully in regional affairs (Yapp, 1996: 221, 402-
410). The Suez War had two consequences for foreign policy. Nasser wanted to modernize the 
Egyptian economy, society and military, in order to be prepared for the next confrontation with 
Israel, and the second consequence was more activism in Arab affairs – short lived union with Syria 
and involvement in the Yemen Civil War. Both consequences led to national security being a top 
priority in the cabinet and budget (Barnett, 1992: 94).  
The government’s objective of development and domestic capitals reluctance to cooperate, led to 
the confiscation of their assets. As a result, the government was able to mobilize resources for 
national defense without the constraints they had previously faced. The state’s remarkable 
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autonomy increased Nasser’s already tight control over the decision-making process. Consequently, 
defense spending continued to rise, especially with Egyptian involvement in the Yemen Civil War 
1962-1967 (see table 4). The increase in defense spending led to budgetary pressures and balance of 
payments difficulties. The state was left with few options to deal with these issues, since it lacked 
administrative muscle to extract taxes, but also because Nasser was hesitant to increase society’s 
contribution by raising direct taxes. Therefore, the state raised indirect taxes on commodities, such 
as sugar, cement and gasoline. However, this was not enough to cover the budget deficit, and again 
the state turned to foreign assistance. Through public sector borrowing, the state managed to finance 
its budget deficit, at the same time the annual debt increased fivefold in the years 1959-1963. By 
1964 Egypt was experiencing a balance of payments and foreign currency reserves crisis. This time 
the Soviets were again indispensible, as they helped alleviate pressure from the primary source of 
balance of payments deficit, which emanated from weapons imports. An agreement reached in 
1965, led the Soviets to write off 50% of military debts and the installments due over the period 
1966-1970 were postponed. As long as the Soviet Union and international lending agencies were 
willing to subsidize the burden, Nasser would not reduce the scope of his objectives or change his 
financial strategy (Ibid.: 97-100). 
After the 1967 War, Nasser’s reputation was staked on his ability to confront the Israeli’s and 
regain the lost Sinai Peninsula. Therefore, defense expenditures increased during this period, in 
1966 defense costs were 11.1% of GNP and by 1973 it was at a staggering 31% of GNP (see table 
4). Even though there was societal agreement concerning the need to confront the Israeli’s, there 
were two problems. The first problem was the demand by the student movement in 1968 of the 
continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which put pressure on the government, since it was not 
militarily sound to continue the war yet. The demonstrations also undermined the political basis of 
the government, which increased the possibility of anti-governmental opposition, if the government 
were to impose more economic hardship, i.e. raising direct taxes. The second problem was whether 
defense or economic development would receive a greater share of societal resources. This issue 
was debated in the cabinet from December 1967 through March 1968, with the result that economic 
development and the defense effort should proceed simultaneously. However, it is apparent from 
the government’s subsequent moves the economy’s health would be sacrificed for defense. Nasser 
was intent on regaining lost territory, and that would come at the expense of future economic 
growth (Ibid.: 105-106). 
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Recapturing Sinai would be done under financial duress. The 1967 War left Egypt needing to 
rebuild the military, and at the same time lacking revenues from the Sinai oil fields, tourism and the 
Suez Canal. The government did not want to increase society’s burden, and therefore attempted to 
increase revenues by promulgating the June 1968 Law of the Encouragement of capital, which led 
to an increase in foreign currency reserves (Ibid.: 110-113). However, this was not enough and 
Nasser needed to pursue an international strategy. Egypt’s Arab policy was changed and Arab unity 
was re-established. Thereafter, the losses incurred by the war were alleviated by Arab aid, which 
came with the greatest of difficulties, because of Egypt’s ties with the Soviet Union (Yapp, 1996: 
222). At the same time the Soviets would supply Egypt with $2.231 billion worth of weapons in the 
period 1967-1973 (Barnett, 1992: 115).    
 
Discussion of foreign assistance during Nasser’s presidency 
Nasser was presented with a problem of how to finance his objectives of modernizing the military, 
promoting economic development and providing welfare for the masses. Nasser was unable to 
increase direct taxes, due to the states limited extraction capabilities. Also, increasing direct taxes 
would have incurred societal discontent, since Egypt was a resource weak country. The state being 
unable to raise direct taxes could also be attributed to the fact that in rentier states bureaucracies 
extraction capabilities are weak, and that a lack of legitimacy entails a low level of taxes – 
according to the implicit social contract between the state and society. This led to the states reliance 
on indirect taxes, since they are hidden from the public eye. However, as defense expenditures rose 
and the resource gap widened, Nasser needed the support of a foreign patron. In 1955, Nasser 
succeeded in gaining the Soviet Union’s support in supplying weapons, loans and aid. Soviet 
assistance allowed Nasser to shield domestic capital and labor from increased taxes, thereby 
securing domestic stability while maintaining his objectives.  
In rentier states, an economic crisis will lead to a fundamental crisis of the state. Therefore, there is 
a need pursue an externally directed strategy in times of economic crisis, if an internally directed 
strategy is deemed risky – raising direct taxes or through austerity measures. By the mid-1960s 
Egypt was experiencing a balance of payments and foreign currency reserves crisis, and lacked 
administrative capacity to extract more direct taxes. This time the combination of public sector 
borrowing and Soviet assistance helped finance the budget deficit. By 1967, Egypt had fought three 
45 
 
wars, which had grave consequences for the economy. In addition, Israeli occupation of the Sinai 
meant that the resources from the Suez Canal, Sinai oil fields and tourism were lost. Again, an 
externally directed strategy was chosen, this time Arab and Soviet aid helped ensure regime 
survival by providing much needed rents.  
To sum up, in the period 1952-1970 foreign assistance was mainly used to fill the resource gap that 
Egypt was facing, due to rising defense expenditures, economic development and the need to 
provide welfare for the masses. The availability of external rents led to regime stability, since 
Nasser did not need to raise direct taxes, which reinforced the implicit social contract between the 
state and society.  
 
4.2 Sadat’s presidency, 1970-1981 
In this section Sadat’s presidency will be examined in relation to the level of political culture, 
informal institutions and foreign assistance. The first part deals with political culture, where the 
procedures for the transfer of power; the public’s attachment to civil institutions; and whether the 
public is well-mobilized into private associations will be discussed. The second part deals with 
informal institutions, where patronage networks will be highlighted and discussed. The third part 
deals with foreign assistance, where the significance of the rentier state behavior of the Egyptian 
government will be discussed.  
 
4.2.1 Political culture  
The lack of a political formula for the transfer of power, and lack of a general acceptance for the 
ruler’s claim to govern, became apparent after Nasser’s death in October 1970. The Vice-president 
Anwar el-Sadat became president, mainly because he was the legal successor, but also due to his 
affiliation with the Free Officers (he was one of the original members). However, he was 
considered a temporary head of state by his rivals who wanted to remove him, and place Ali Sabri – 
head of the ASU – in his place. In May 1971, Sadat defeated his rivals and consolidated power, by 
arresting Sabri and his supporters for plotting a coup (Yapp, 1996: 223-224).     
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In the early 1970’s, widespread public involvement and attachment to civil institutions was 
deficient. After Sadat had triumphed over his rivals, his immediate problem was confronting Israel 
while maintaining his political basis. The Egyptian military was not capable of defeating the Israeli 
forces, but Sadat believed that a small victory would give him a position to negotiate from. 
However, four years of war preparation with no progress on the Arab-Israeli front was becoming 
painfully clear on regime stability. Sadat announced that 1971 would be the year of decision, but 
when it passed with no decision being made, demonstrations erupted (Ibid.: 224). The domestic 
opposition forces listed three principal objections. First, the non-democratic character of Sadat’s 
regime, and demanded more societal representation and participation. Second, the return of 
industrial capital and the landed elite in Sadat’s coalition worried the lower classes that the gains 
they had made under Nasser would be erased. The third objection was regarding the government’s 
inability to deal with the Arab-Israeli conflict (Barnett, 1992: 108-109).   
Despite the implementation of political changes, the public was not well mobilized into private 
associations that could influence policy outcomes. With the limited victory of the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War, Sadat’s standing was greatly enhanced and he initiated a controlled opening of the political 
process. Sadat raised the possibility of introducing a multi-party system and encouraged a freer 
debate in the press. In 1976, three parties within the ASU emerged representing Left, Right and 
Centre, and were allowed to contest for the parliamentary elections of that year. The Centre party 
won 280 seats and became the dominant party, whilst the country’s other main political forces, such 
as the MB, the Nasserites, the Wafd and the Communists were all restricted from the elections. 
Furthermore, the Centre party became the government party, and was led by Sadat himself and later 
by his trusted Vice-president Hosni Mubarak. The other ‘official’ parties functioned as pressure 
groups which were allowed to criticize within prescribed limits. The mass party system of Nasser’s 
time was over and the ASU was dissolved in 1980. The Centre party was called the Arab Socialist 
Union of Egypt, and was later renamed the National Democratic Party (NDP) (Yapp, 1996: 225), 
which would dominate parliament until Mubarak’s ouster in 2011. As a result of the new parties, 
parliament also experienced some modifications. However, the single chamber assembly had little 
real power under Sadat. The parliament began to function as a forum for interest articulation for the 
upper classes, a source of limited government oversight in some areas, and a channel for elite 
recruitment. The areas of defense and foreign policy, where off limits for the parliament, which 
reflected Sadat’s centralized and highly personalized decision-making style (Barnett, 1993: 132-
133).    
47 
 
Another indication of the lack of widespread attachment to civil institutions came in 1977. The 
government decided to cut down on food subsidies, as part of the conditions for obtaining a loan 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Immediately after, the ‘bread riots’ broke out in Cairo 
and other cities, causing the government great distress. The police and security services were 
overwhelmed by the enormous amounts of students, workers and urban poor demonstrators, and 
were unable to contain them. As a last resort, Sadat called on the armed forces to suppress the riots 
(Harb, 2003: 283). Minister of Defense General Abdel Ghani Gamasy informed Sadat that the 
armed forces would only intervene if Sadat rescinded the cuts on subsidies. Sadat agreed and the 
armed forces suppressed the demonstrations (Hashim, 2011a: 73). Afterwards, Sadat blamed the 
Left, but the bread riots embraced a broader spectrum of opposition including Islamic 
fundamentalists (Yapp, 1996: 227).  
Even though Sadat’s assassination at the hands of an Islamic group was not a sign of widespread 
discontent, it was a sign that a segment of society had become frustrated over Sadat’s foreign policy 
and political suppression. The reappearance of Islam as a political force in Egypt came after the 
defeat in the 1967 War, where the bareness of secular nationalism became evident. Also the influx 
of traditionally minded villagers into big towns, and later in the mid-1970’s, hostility towards the 
effects of Sadat’s economic policies, reinforced this phenomenon. However, Islam was not one 
unitary force, it had many faces. Some supported the state, but advocated a return of Islamic law 
and a more forceful opposition to Israel, such as the orthodox ulema (scholars trained in Islam and 
Islamic law). The MB, who was restricted from involvement in politics, expressed hostility towards 
Western influence. The MB’s exclusion from politics and lack of political action, led to the 
emergence of a number of small activist Muslim groups who were against the government, some of 
which preached armed uprising (Ibid.: 227). In the early 1970’s Sadat had even nurtured some of 
these Islamic groups to counter the weight of his Nasserist and Leftist rivals. However, these groups 
grew more and more hostile towards Sadat’s foreign policy, as Sadat had begun direct negotiations 
with Israel and forged an alliance with the United States. Furthermore, Sadat’s economic policies 
had become too overwhelming, and the controlled political liberalization produced a wealth of 
demands, which he was neither willing nor able to address. Also Sadat had become erratic; he 
began arresting his supporters for disloyalty and he imprisoned his opponents, mostly prominent 
Islamic leaders. These groups became more disillusioned and in October 1981, Sadat was 
assassinated by an Islamic group in the army (Harb, 2003: 284). 
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Discussion of the level of political culture during Sadat’s presidency 
The political culture during the period 1970-1981, can be characterized as being low, i.e. public 
attachment to political institutions is limited, the public is weakly organized and disputes arise in 
relation to the institutions and procedures of the regime (Finer, 2006: 89). Nasser had remained 
unabated as president for fourteen years. After Nasser’s death, Sadat took over the post as president 
because he was the legal successor, but also due to his ties to the Free Officers. This is an indication 
of a lack of widespread public approval for the procedures for the transfer of power, since Sadat 
was chosen by the Nasserist elite as a temporary head of state, and not because he got elected 
president. Furthermore, the plot to remove Sadat by the remaining Nasserist elite and the riots of 
1972, indicate that the ruler’s claim to govern and be obeyed was generally not accepted. The 
controlled political liberalization during Sadat’s presidency produced multi-party elections. 
However, the elections were not exactly free, as the only parties allowed to compete in the elections 
were from within the ASU. The other main political forces were restricted from the elections, which 
indicate that the public was not well mobilized into private associations which could influence 
policy outcomes. In 1972 societal discontent led to demonstrations, where the domestic opposition 
objected to the non-democratic character of Sadat’s regime. Also the bread riots of 1977 came as a 
response to cuts on subsidies, which could be attributed to the implicit social contract where a lack 
of accountability by the government is replaced by state provided welfare. When the state ran out of 
resources it was unable to maintain regime stability. Both examples indicate a lack of widespread 
public involvement and attachment to civil institutions.    
 
4.2.2 Informal institutions 
The death of Nasser left cabinet ministers vying for political supremacy. Anwar el-Sadat, who was 
the Vice-president at the time, was the legal successor, but he lacked the charisma Nasser had, and 
also a power base. Therefore, his rivals considered him a temporary head of state, but Sadat proved 
to be more durable than initially thought (Yapp, 1996: 223-224). His rivals encompassed a joint 
military-civilian challenge, consisting of Ali Sabri head of the ASU, Minister of Interior Shaarawi 
Gumaa, Minister for Presidential Affairs Sami Sharaf and Minister of War General Muhammad 
Fawzi. The key rival was Ali Sabri, whom everybody thought would ultimately triumph over Sadat. 
This group began conspiring to remove Sadat from the moment he became President. However, 
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they did not know that Sadat was aware of an emerging conspiracy among the top members of the 
Nasserist elite. The plan was for Fawzi to bring the support of the military behind Sabri, but they 
miscalculated on three points. First, as a consequence of the politicization of the military in the 
1950’s and 1960s, the officer corps was unwilling to get involved in a political gamble. Second, 
they underestimated the powers of the President, and the enormous legitimacy that followed with 
the position. Third, they did not expect Chief of Staff Muhammad Sadiq and the rest of the senior 
officers to stand by Sadat (Hashim, 2011a: 72). By May 1971, Sadat had cultivated the loyalty of 
his rivals’ deputies and he initiated the ‘Corrective Revolution’, where he began to dismiss and 
arrest his rivals. In the place of his rivals, he installed his supporters into positions of power. Sadiq 
became Minister of War and Muhammad Nasif became Commander of the Presidential Guard. 
They both owed their positions and therefore their loyalty to Sadat (Harb, 2003: 281-282). 
Even though Sadat had a different style of leadership than Nasser, he also used the military as a 
base for legitimacy and power. Sadat’s leadership style was based on manipulating the officer 
corps, by using individual officers against each other. Another strategy used by Sadat, which was 
similar to Nasser, was that he used his presidential powers to dismiss officers and ministers when 
they disagreed with him (Ibid.: 282). In October 1972 Sadiq objected to Sadat’s policy regarding 
war with Israel, the next day he was replaced by the apolitical General Ahmed Ismail, who ensured 
compliance with Sadat’s objectives (Gawrych, 2000: 134). After the 1973 war, Sadat dismissed 
Chief of Staff Saad al-Shazli over a disagreement concerning Sadat’s decision to cooperate with the 
United States and start peace negotiations with Israel, and appointed General Abdel Ghani Gamasy. 
The strategy of sidelining and dismissing officers and ministers produced two effects, it ensured the 
depoliticization of the military and it created obedient and loyal elites, who recognized that their 
careers depended on their allegiance to Sadat (Hashim, 2011a: 73).  
The depoliticization of the military during Sadat’s presidency can be illustrated by comparing the 
number of cabinet ministers with military backgrounds, to those of Nasser’s presidency. Between 
the years 1956-1970 military presence in the cabinet ranged from 36.4% to 65.5% and in the years 
1970-1977 it ranged from 9.1% to 33.3% (see table 3). Moreover, there is a clear decline in 
ministers with military backgrounds from 1967 (65.5%) to 1977 (9.7%). During Sadat’s presidency 
six individuals occupied the post of Prime Minister, out of which two were former military officers. 
Out of the 163 ministers who served under Sadat, 32 were either active or former officers (Harb, 
2003: 284). Although, the composition of the political elite changed during Sadat’s presidency, it 
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was still in essence a civil-military bureaucratic elite, which was dependant on a powerful and 
centralized state (Yapp, 1996: 229).         
Despite the controlled political opening – experimentation with multi-party elections and freedom 
of speech – real power was in the hands of Sadat and his new elite. The new elites were consisting 
of businessmen, bureaucrats, technocrats and some officers. Some of the most influential of them 
owed their position to their family ties with Sadat, such as the businessmen Osman Ahmed Osman 
and Sayyed Marei. Other prominent members of Sadat’s inner circle included former Air Force 
Commander Hosni Mubarak, who was second in the hierarchy after Sadat, Mamduh Salem, who 
served as Minister of Interior and then as Prime Minister, and Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala, who 
replaced Gamasy as Minister of War. Other ministers were not as durable and were chosen 
primarily for their particular expertise. Sadat also depended heavily on the security apparatus which 
was split into three branches; under the President, the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Interior 
(Ibid.: 225-226).  
 
Discussion of the informal institutions during Sadat’s presidency 
The socio-political patterns of interaction in the period 1970-1981 can be characterized as being 
neo-patrimonial in nature, i.e. the formal political administrative system is permeated by 
relationships of loyalty and dependence (Clapham, 1985: 48). During Sadat’s presidency, the state 
was powerful and centralized, with obedient political elite. Through the Corrective Revolution in 
1971, Sadat successfully removed his rivals and put in their place ministers who were loyal to him. 
However, obedience was just as important for Sadat, and when coupled with exceptional 
presidential powers, Sadat was able to filter out any opposition from within the elite. Throughout 
Sadat’s presidency ministers would be removed over disagreements or objections towards Sadat’s 
policies, whether economic, political or related to the military. This created elites who recognized 
that their careers depended on their adherence to Sadat. The limited victory over Israel in 1973, 
granted Sadat the legitimacy he required to pursue his foreign and economic policies. Therefore, 
Sadat began to install technocrats, businessmen, bureaucrats and officers, who either had family ties 
with Sadat, or who were adherents of his policies. The economic policies created an independent 
economic bourgeoisie, who were protected by Sadat. And the foreign policies, such as the peace 
negotiations with Israel, allowed Sadat to filter out any opposition, especially from within the 
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military. The new generals who were completely loyal and obedient to the president, such as 
Mubarak and Abu Ghazala became the model for promotion in the military during Sadat’s 
presidency.       
 
4.2.3 Foreign assistance 
Soviet generosity declined during Sadat’s early years as president. Egypt had lost 80% of its 
military equipment in the 1967 war, and the Soviets were initially understanding of the Egyptian 
financial predicament, so the resupply was viewed as a gift. Following the resupply, the Soviets 
were subsidizing Egyptian weapons purchases in three ways. The Soviets were selling weapons at 
discount rates; they were providing Egypt with long term, low interest contracts; and they were 
trading weapons for Egyptian commodities. Furthermore, the Soviets were willing to extend a long 
payback period. But by 1970, Egypt had not paid for any of its weapons imports since the 1967 war. 
Soviet generosity reached its limit and in March 1972, the Soviets demanded full payment for all 
weapons. See table 5 for an indication of how much the Egyptian government owed the Soviet 
Union. There were two reasons behind Soviet actions. First, the Soviet-American détente meant that 
the Soviets were interested in keeping an eye on Egyptian officials, to make sure that their actions 
did not disrupt U.S.-Soviet relations. Second, the Kremlin believed that Egyptian weapons imports 
could be paid for in hard currency by the Saudis and the Libyans (Barnett, 1992: 115-116). 
          Table 5. Soviet-Egyptian military accounts (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
 
   Source: Efrat 1983, in Barnett, 1992: Appendix 4  
 
The Soviet assistance, which was mainly used by Sadat to maneuver between demands of political 
stability and battle preparations, was rapidly disappearing. The Soviet demand could not have come 
in a worse moment; the Saudis had stopped their assistance program because of Egypt’s ties with 
the Soviets. Also, in early 1972 the economy was in a downward spiral, as a result of escalating 
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balance of payments difficulties and skyrocketing foreign debt. Societal frustration was on the rise 
and Sadat was unable to raise direct taxes (Hashim, 2011a: 72). Sadat needed to find new ways of 
deflating societal pressures, so he undertook a number of measures which would bolster his 
domestic standing at the expense of fiscal responsibility, such as lowering the price on basic 
commodities, improving public transportation and relaxing foreign exchange controls (Barnett, 
1992: 116).  
Soon after, Sadat was faced with the problem of urgently needing to increase the flow of financial 
resources, in order to prepare for the coming war and to protect the regime from potential domestic 
challenges. This led Sadat to initiate a series of diplomatic maneuvers that would revive Soviet and 
Arab assistance. In July 1972, Sadat evicted the Soviet advisers, a move that would eventually 
facilitate Saudi assistance (Yapp, 1996: 224). The bold move by Sadat led to his enrichment, as the 
Soviets were determined to maintain their superpower status. The Soviets stepped up their weapons 
transfers from $350 million in 1971 to $550 million in 1972 and then a staggering $850 million in 
1973. Sadat knew that the Soviet expulsion would be useful for attracting Saudi assistance as King 
Faysal was deeply anti-communist. In January 1973, during the Arab Defense Council, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait agreed to supply Egypt with the needed security assistance, which would prove 
crucial for allowing Sadat to maintain both political stability and battle preparations. By mid-1973 
substantial pressures were building on the government, societal discontent was on the rise and the 
economies remaining resources were depleted. Sadat believed that if Egypt did not go to war soon, 
then the government would face widespread societal disturbances, and the oil-rich Arab states 
would not continue to support Egypt (Barnett, 1992:117-119). 
The limited victory in the Yom Kippur War of 1973 greatly improved Sadat’s legitimacy, but the 
costs of the war were approximately $3.7 billion, which augmented Egypt’s already bankrupt status. 
Egypt’s national debt totaled roughly $10 billion and the annual deficit averaged LE1.3 billion in 
the years 1973-76, which left the government needing to discover a way of narrowing the resource 
gap. The government capitalized on the popularity acquired from the war and made a limited 
attempt at raising indirect taxes. However, the burden was disproportionally increased on the 
middle and lower classes, as a result of these extraction policies. The government’s unwillingness to 
raise direct taxes was due to its economic policy, but also due to the state apparatus’ inability to 
extract revenue. Sadat was determined to reorient Egypt’s economic direction and introduce a new 
economic policy dependent upon capitalist investment – al-infitah (Arabic for ‘the opening’, in this 
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case economic opening). This led to an expansion of the social power of the capitalist class and 
business interests generally, and a new bias in the policy favored the wealthy (Ibid.: 135-136). 
By reducing taxes on the capitalist class, the government was attempting to encourage productivity, 
investment and savings. However, as a result the tax system lost any propensity towards 
progressiveness, there was a general concession towards capital, and as a consequence there was a 
high degree of tax evasion practiced by the elite. During this period the state’s collection of taxes as 
a percentage of GNP declined. The state’s ability to monitor commodity movements and the lack of 
political power among the landed classes and the peasants was reflected in the agricultural sector’s 
contribution to the government’s outlays, which rose from 15% in 1972 to 30% in 1975. However, 
the societal pressure created by the New Year’s Day 1975 protests against high prices and low 
wages, and the 1977 food riots, forced a steady budgetary expansion. This was also due to Sadat’s 
commitment to both placating the masses with subsidized goods and services and rewarding the 
upper classes for their contributions (Ibid.: 136-137). 
Since the state’s extraction capacities were limited, Sadat was more eager to cash in on his 
legitimacy with foreign actors. The oil-rich Arab states were willing to reward Sadat for his 
achievements, and offered to defray the costs of the 1973 War. According to Israeli sources, Egypt 
received $4.2 billion between October 1973 and April 1975, in outright grants. However, the Arab 
grant was met with dissatisfaction, since Egypt had spent approximately $40 billion in a quarter of a 
century to defend Arab land (Ibid.: 137-138). The paucity of Arab financial support and the 
worsening economic condition, led Sadat to pursue a separate peace negotiation with Israel in 1975. 
Arab aid slowly declined during this period as Sadat visited Jerusalem, and diminished completely 
when he signed the Camp David Accords in 1979 (Yapp, 1996: 228). The Soviets were also 
displeased with Egypt’s foreign policy and closer ties with the United States, and were not willing 
to reschedule the debt owed by Egypt, which amounted to $4 billion in non-military and $7 billion 
in military obligations. Relations with the Soviets continued to deteriorate and by March 1976 Sadat 
terminated the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship. As Soviet and Arab aid declined, U.S. aid 
increased. The United States was rewarding Sadat for his participation in the peace process with 
Israel, and for his anti-Soviet stance. This marked the beginning of Egypt’s alliance with the U.S. 
and an end to Egypt’s historic mission of shouldering the burden of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Thus, 
after the 1973 war the U.S. slowly replaced the Soviet Union and began to provide Egypt with 
injections of economic and military aid (Barnett, 1992: 139). 
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Discussion of foreign assistance during Sadat’s presidency 
Foreign assistance during the early years of Sadat’s presidency was mainly used to rebuild the 
Egyptian military and to slow down the expanding resource gap, which was relevant for 
maintaining the military’s loyalty and the implicit social contract. When Sadat took over the post as 
president, the combined effects of defense expenditures, costs of the War of Attrition and continued 
Israeli presence on the Sinai left the economy in a downward spiral, and Sadat was unable to raise 
direct taxes due to the states limited extraction capabilities. Furthermore, societal frustration was on 
the rise and raising taxes would have had devastating effects on regime stability due to the implicit 
social contract. Society’s patience had been spent on years of war preparation, with repossession of 
the Sinai nowhere in sight. As a result, Sadat had to pursue an externally directed strategy. 
However, the Soviets were growing impatient, due to a lack of payment by the Egyptian 
government, and demanded payment in full for Egypt’s enormous debt, whilst the Saudis would not 
continue their assistance program due to Egypt’s ties with the Soviets. Therefore, Sadat undertook a 
series of diplomatic maneuvers that successfully revived Arab and Soviet aid, which was essential 
for maintaining political stability and battle preparations.  
After the 1973 war, foreign assistance was used to narrow the resource gap, but later with Sadat’s 
shift towards the West it was also used to gain a negotiated settlement with Israel and access to 
capital markets, which was necessary for maintaining the implicit social contract. Due to the 1973 
war the Egyptian economy was again in dire straits and Sadat needed to find a way to narrow the 
resource gap. The state’s limited extraction capacity combined with increasing societal discontent 
meant that Sadat needed to pursue an externally directed strategy. Arab aid was granted, but it was 
perceived by Egyptian officials as barely minimum compared to the resources Egypt had spent on 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The modest Arab contribution and Egypt’s deteriorating economy, was an 
important factor behind Sadat’s decision to shift Egypt’s foreign allegiance from East to West. 
Sadat desperately wanted to regain the lost revenue from the Suez Canal, Sinai oil fields and 
tourism, and was left with no alternative but to seek a negotiated settlement with Israel. Only the 
United States could mediate a peace between Egypt and Israel, they also had access to capital 
markets, which Sadat needed to encourage investment. 
To sum up, in the period 1970-1981 foreign assistance was mainly used to slow down the 
expanding resource gap and regain lost revenues from the Sinai. Due to the rentier nature of the 
Egyptian government, Sadat desperately needed the external rents that the Sinai Peninsula provided. 
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Also it was not possible to maintain the implicit social contract if Sadat had to rely on Soviet and 
Arab aid. This led Sadat to reorient Egypt’s foreign policy to the West.  
 
4.3 Mubarak’s presidency, 1981-2011 
In this section Mubarak’s presidency will be examined in relation to the level of political culture, 
informal institutions and foreign assistance. The first part will be about political culture, where the 
procedures for the transfer of power; the public’s attachment to civil institutions; and whether the 
public is well-mobilized into private associations will be discussed. The second part will be about 
informal institutions, where patronage networks will be highlighted and discussed. The third part 
will be about foreign assistance, where the significance of the rentier state behavior of the Egyptian 
government will be discussed.  
 
4.3.1 Political culture 
Following the assassination of Sadat on the 6
th
 of October 1981, the Vice-president Hosni Mubarak 
was nominated for the presidency. As Cook (2007: 74) states: ‘’a basis of support within the 
military high command has historically been an informal requirement for the position’’. Mubarak’s 
ascent to the presidency was quick and efficient, and unlike his predecessors, he was not confronted 
with a particular power struggle at the beginning of his tenure in office (Kassem, 2004: 26 & 
Nassif, 2013: 515). Since Mubarak lacked the charisma that Nasser and Sadat had, he was regarded 
as a temporary leader, with too few political skills to remain in power. Nevertheless, despite 
numerous obstacles and threats, Mubarak managed to consolidate power and remain in office until 
2011 (Hashim, 2011b: 106). 
A state of emergency was declared after Sadat’s assassination, and was renewed roughly every 
three years by Mubarak until it was removed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
in 2012. Under the state of emergency police powers were extended, constitutional rights were 
suspended and censorship was legalized. Mubarak justified the use of emergency law as a necessary 
measure, to combat terrorism and maintain stability in the country (Kassem, 1999: 57-58). 
However, the emergency law was mainly used to arrest opponents of the regime, whether violent 
terrorists or non-violent political opponents, and to convict them in military courts. Mass arrests of 
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Islamists were conducted, and political opposition groups, such as the MB or the Liberals were 
suppressed by the emergency powers. Mubarak increasingly used these emergency powers to 
consolidate and maintain political power (Reza, 2007: 546-547). 
During the 1980’s the Central Security Forces (CSF) had numbered almost half a million. A 
majority of the CSF soldiers were uneducated and were conscripted because they did not qualify for 
military service. The soldiers were paid a salary equivalent of four U.S. dollars a month and 
received two meals a day (Brownlee, 2012: 53). When the government in 1986 proposed to increase 
the required term of service from three to four years, 20,000 CSF soldiers revolted. The disgruntled 
soldiers rampaged through Cairo, setting fire to hotels, shops and numerous cars. Fearing that the 
revolt would gain traction, Mubarak ordered the military to quell the rebellion. Defense Minister 
Abu-Ghazala moved the military in and quashed the rioters, leaving almost a hundred dead and 
thousands detained (Hashim, 2011b: 108). 
The Egyptian political system continued to be dominated by Mubarak, as he was elected president 
for five consecutive terms, of six years each. The procedures for the nomination of the President of 
the Republic are described in Article 76 of the 1971 constitution, which stipulates that the People’s 
Assembly nominates a candidate for the presidency. The candidate must obtain two-thirds of the 
parliament’s votes in order to proceed to the second stage of the elections. During the second stage 
of the elections, the candidate is referred to the people for a plebiscite. Furthermore, there are no 
limits on the number of terms for which a president can be re-nominated (Ries, 1999: 334). 
Therefore, the multi-party arena, which Mubarak inherited from Sadat, had the potential of 
challenging Mubarak’s personal authoritarian system (Kassem, 2004: 26). Mubarak needed the 
support of two-thirds of parliament to ensure that he would be nominated president, and the 
emergency laws would prove crucial in this aspect as Mubarak was able to silence political 
opposition and guarantee NDP’s domination of the parliament.   
Despite the above mentioned, the parliamentary elections of 1984 and 1987 were freer than those of 
the 1970’s and witnessed the emergence of a more substantial opposition. Political parties, 
including those that adhered to a mild form of Islamic radicalism, became freer to operate publicly. 
During the 1984 elections, an alliance between the outlawed MB and the Neo-Wafd party was 
formed. They won a combined fifty-eight seats and became the second party after the NDP. In the 
1987 elections, the MB formed an alliance with the Labor party and the Liberals, and won sixty 
seats (Harb, 2003: 284-285). The supreme constitutional court eventually ruled the 1987 
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parliamentary elections invalid and new elections were held in 1990, where the NDP won 348 seats 
and maintained its majority. However, the low voter turnout (25% of the electorate) and a boycott 
from the main opposition parties meant that the utility of the parliament as a body where some form 
of national consensus could be discovered or created was consequently reduced. The dominance of 
the NDP and the elimination of Islamist opposition were affirmed by the parliamentary elections of 
1995. The elections, which were largely violent and government controlled, netted the NDP 416 
seats in the assembly (Yapp, 1996: 452-453). Furthermore, the NDP remained the dominant party in 
the parliament throughout Mubarak’s presidency, see table 6. By dominating the parliament, 
Mubarak was nominated for the presidency every six years in the period 1981-1999, where he 
received overwhelming percentages of ‘yes’ votes during presidential referenda, see table 7. 
However, these results were a reversion to the false plebiscites of Nasser and Sadat, and they 
allowed Mubarak to claim formally total popular support, i.e. absolute legal legitimacy (Kassem, 
1999: 33-34)   
                         Table 6. Results of parliamentary elections 1984-2010 
Year 1984 1987 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
NDP* 87% 78% 90% 93% 87% 72% 97% 
* Includes NDP independents (Independent politicians not nominated by the NDP, but affiliate themselves with the 
party once they are elected MP’s), except for 1984 where independents were not allowed to compete in the elections.   
       Sources: Data for 1984-1995 was taken from (Ries, 1999: 343-344). Data for 2000 was taken from (Thabet, 2006: 
17). Data for 2005 was taken from (Kassem, 2006: 132). Data for 2010 was taken from (Shahin, 2012: 53) 
 
 
 
                            Table 7. Results of presidential referenda 1981-1999 
Year 1981 1987 1993 1999 
Mubarak 98.5% 97.1% 96.3% 93.7% 
 Sources: Data for 1981-1993 was taken from (Ries, 1999: 345). Data for 1999 was taken from (Abaza, 2006: 10). 
As the political arena was dominated by Mubarak and the NDP, opposition by militant Islamists 
was on the rise. By the end of the 1980’s al-Gama’a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) had 
resurfaced. Members of this group propagated a highly traditional form of Islam, and spread their 
message in rural communities and shantytowns of Cairo, tapping into feelings of economic 
deprivation. The movement also formed an armed wing and attempted to assassinate Interior 
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Minister Zaki Badr in 1989, but was unsuccessful. In 1990, a second attempt to assassinate Badr 
failed, the assassins had targeted the wrong limousine, killing Speaker of the Parliament Rifaat 
Mahjub instead. The assassinations continued and in 1992 social critic Farag Foda, who was known 
for his secularist views, was killed. The Egyptian state retaliated with a massive crackdown, 
initiating the bloodiest decade in Mubarak’s presidency. Later in 1993 the city of Imbaba in the 
middle of Cairo, had turned into an Islamic micro-state. A preacher called Sheikh Gaber, had 
proven that the Islamic Group could ‘Islamicize’ communities in the country’s heart. For three 
years, Gaber’s followers had enforced strict Islamic morality in Imbaba. The government deployed 
14,000 police to destroy the ‘urban emirate’. After three weeks the state prevailed but casualties on 
both sides were more than a hundred. After this episode, the Islamic Group, who had failed to 
galvanize popular support, decided to change their strategy. From 1993 onwards they started 
attacking tourists, a campaign that had an immense effect on the economy. The Islamic Group also 
tried but failed to assassinate Mubarak in 1995 during an official visit to Ethiopia. By 1997, 
Egyptian forces had captured or killed the Islamic Group’s seasoned fighters, and in July of that 
year the organization declared a unilateral ceasefire. However, later that year another faction of the 
militant Islamist opposition rejected the ceasefire and killed tourists in Luxor. Following the Luxor 
massacre, the remaining rejectionists within the group were isolated. A second ceasefire was 
proposed in 1999, and this time it stuck (Brownlee, 2012: 59-63).  
In 2005 Article 76 of the 1971 constitution was amended to allow for multi-candidate elections. 
However, the amendment was structured in a manner, which made it very difficult to challenge the 
incumbent president. Eligibility for presidential candidacy was limited to members who held 
leadership positions in political parties. Political parties had to be established five years prior to the 
elections; their members had to occupy 5% of the seats in the People’s Assembly and 5% of the 
seats in the Shura (Consultative) Council. But, since none of the opposition parties occupied such a 
number of seats in the 2000-2005 parliamentary term, the constitutional amendment stated that 
those restrictions would first come into force during the 2011 presidential elections. On the other 
hand, the restrictions on independent candidates were even more constraining, and unlike party 
restrictions, they were in effect during the 2005 elections. In order to become eligible for 
nomination, an independent candidate had to obtain 250 signatures of support from various elected 
officials (members of the People’s Assembly, members of the Shura Council and local council 
members). This was almost impossible as the NDP dominated the People’s Assembly, the Shura 
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Council, and controlled 98.5% of local council seats in the country’s twenty-six governorates 
(Kassem, 2006: 127).    
To no one’s surprise, Mubarak won the presidential elections with 88.5% of the votes (Ibid.: 130). 
According to official turnout data, 22.9% of the electorate voted. However, official turnout numbers 
should be treated as an upper bound, as politicians in developing countries, tend to inflate turnout 
numbers in order to exaggerate their popularity (Brownlee, 2011: 819, 822). Regardless of whether 
or not the official data is correct, 22.9% of the electorate voting says a lot about the lack of public 
involvement and attachment to the political formula, for the transfer of power. Perhaps it is not hard 
to understand, given the nature of the presidential elections. The elections lacked a semblance of 
fairness on several fronts. Due to the application of emergency law, legalized political parties over 
the decades were denied political rights and opportunities, which would have rendered them 
plausible candidates. It also meant that most citizens – on a nation-wide level – had never heard of 
opposition candidates or their respective parties. Furthermore, opposition candidates were allocated 
only nineteen days for campaigning, with a maximum limit of LE10 million on campaign 
expenditures, which none of the candidates except for Mubarak and Numan Goma’a (2 out of 10 
candidates) were able to fundraise. The unfairness of the elections was further aggravated by the 
NDP’s monopoly on state resources (Kassem, 2006: 129-130).    
The 2005 parliamentary elections, which were carried out just two months after the presidential 
elections, proved that under Mubarak’s system, serious presidential elections were improbable – 
due to the new rules on presidential candidacy. Election monitoring teams were excluded from 
watching the process, opposition voters were obstructed from voting, with violence against them 
resulting in fifteen deaths and hundreds wounded. At the same time NDP voters were spared from 
the violence, given pre-marked ballots and even bribed with thirty-five Egyptian pounds. These 
tactics guaranteed the NDP success in the elections, who remained above the two-thirds majority 
needed to renew the state of emergency and undertake constitutional amendments. However, the 
elections reproduced the Mubarak-MB dichotomy, instead of advancing – not tampering with voters 
– liberal parties like al-Ghad Party. The MB had managed to win an unprecedented eighty-eight 
seats in parliament, the biggest gains of independent seats in the history of Egyptian parliamentary 
elections. The 2005 parliamentary elections were used by Mubarak to reassert control, neutralize 
Ayman Nour – head of the al-Ghad Party – and pave the way for Gamal Mubarak’s succession 
(Brownlee, 2012: 94-95).  
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As Mubarak entered his second decade in power, his health was deteriorating. While delivering a 
televised speech to the parliament in 2003, he collapsed. Mubarak later blamed it on the flu, but his 
trips to Germany in 2004 and 2010, in which he had undergone surgery, made Mubarak’s health a 
hot topic in the media. This was so, mainly because of concerns over who would succeed Mubarak. 
Mubarak had not appointed a vice-president yet – and he would not do it until right before his 
ousting from power in 2011. The vice-president was traditionally the successor, as had happened 
with Sadat in 1970 and Mubarak in 1981. Mubarak’s choice not to appoint a vice-president turned 
the question of who would succeed him into a puzzle, which opened the door for speculation. 
Political analysts speculated that Mubarak was preparing for a hereditary succession, and the rapid 
rise of Gamal Mubarak’s political career was the basis of this speculation (Alterman, 2000: 114). In 
2000 Mubarak appointed his son to general secretariat of the NDP. Gamal Mubarak also headed the 
policy committee of the NDP, which was allegedly the most important organ of the party. The 
presidential election amendments coupled with NDP’s hegemonic majorities in parliament, the 
governorate councils and the fact that the NDP ran the parties’ authorization committee, made it 
very difficult for opposition figures to qualify. This made Gamal Mubarak’s ascent to the 
presidency – if Mubarak decided to resign or in the event of his death – all the more likely. 
Furthermore, hereditary succession was not uncommon in the Middle East. In Syria, Bashar Al-
Asaad had taken over power just hours after Hafez Al-Asaad’s death in 2000. The prospect of the 
same happening in Egypt galvanized the opposition movement named the Egyptian Movement for 
Change (Brownlee, 2012: 88).   
In 2004, in the run off to the 2005 elections, the Egyptian Movement for Change was founded. The 
Movement’s slogan was Kifaya (Enough) – which they later became known as. The Kifaya 
movement was comprised of a coalition of people from a variety of ideological positions, united by 
their opposition to the regime. On the 12
th
 of December 2004, the Kefaya movement rallied in 
downtown Cairo. Their principal demands were that Mubarak step down and that he abstain from 
paving the way for a hereditary succession. Even though the Kefaya movement did not succeed in 
achieving their goals or develop into a mass movement, they did establish a precedent by 
challenging the incumbent regime directly and by encouraging the formation of other groups, such 
as the Egyptian Judges movement and the March 9
th
 movement for university professors and 
students. They were also the first movement to make use of the new social media, as their main 
source of communication and mobilization (Nagarajan, 2013: 34).   
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Through the Ministry of Interior, Mubarak’s regime was well prepared to deal with demonstrations. 
The Ministry of Interior was headed by Habib al-Adly since 1997. Each year the ministry held an 
estimated 20.000 detainees without trial. The ministry had over a million employees not including 
informants and its tentacles reached into Egyptians’ homes, universities, NGO’s and political 
parties. Furthermore, the ministry commanded 800,000 troops for crowd suppression as well as 
450,000 in the CSF. Security officials held Egyptian politics in a ‘clandestine chokehold’. The 
Ministry’s budget expanded between 2005 and 2007 from approximately $1.5 billion $2 billion and 
in 2009 the Ministry bought $744,000 worth of commercial arms and ammunition from the United 
States, and four times that amount in 2010 (Brownlee, 2012: 136-137).  
Despite an ever powerful Ministry of Interior, strikes and rallies continued. Workers’ protests 
gained momentum after 2004, when the regime started a vigorous implementation of privatization 
and other reforms. The workers’ were protesting, low wages, lack of wage supplements, non-
payment of bonuses, and private investors’ failure to uphold their contractual obligations to their 
workers. On the 6
th
 of April 2008 workers in a textile factory struck for three days. This event 
launched the Youth of April 6
th
 movement who supported the workers planning a strike. The 
movement supported the worker’s strikes because they were able to place continuous pressure on 
the regime, which highlighted the inequities of the system and was useful for rallying other sections 
of society to demand change (Nagarajan, 2013: 36). The Youth of April 6
th
 movement continued to 
make use of the new social media and attempted to organize mass demonstrations up until 2011, but 
due to low turnout, they were easily contained by the security forces (Brashear, Girgis & Kimmel, 
2012: 19) 
The 2011 presidential elections offered opposition movements a chance to focus anger against the 
regime. This was so, because in the coming presidential elections or the one after, Gamal Mubarak 
would most probably run as the NDP’s candidate. In 2009, after Mohamed ElBaradei’s return to 
Cairo – he had served three terms as deputy general of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) - the National Coalition for Change was formed. Through this coalition, Web activists, 
Liberals, Islamists and Leftists worked to open the elections. The demands of the coalition were: the 
removal of restrictions on aspiring candidates; media access for all movements and candidates; 
voting through national ID cards; enfranchisement of Egyptians living abroad; and a two term limit 
on the presidency. The coalition gathered support, as tens of thousands signed on. In 2010 the 
coalition called for a boycott of the legislative elections, which was initially ignored by most 
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opposition parties, but as the NDP cruised though victories in the first round of voting, they joined 
the boycott (Brownlee, 2012: 139-141).  
The National Coalition for Change was strengthened by an event in Alexandria that highlighted the 
Ministry of Interior’s vulgarity. Khaled Said was an internet café dweller, who was targeted by the 
police because he had earlier uploaded videos of police brutality and corruption. On the 6
th
 of June 
2009, two officers entered the internet café, which Khaled Said was going to and attempted to arrest 
him without a warrant. When he resisted he was dragged into a nearby apartment building and 
beaten to death. As news of the murder, together with pictures of a beaten to death Khaled Said 
spread virally, ElBaradei’s supporters formed a group on Facebook called We Are All Khaled Said. 
Thousands marched in Said’s memory and demanded accountability from the Ministry of Interior. 
However, the lack of accountability underscored the oppositions point, as the charges filed on the 
two suspected officers were repeatedly delayed. By the end of 2010, the We Are All Khaled Said 
group had gathered 350,000 members (Cole, 2012: 489).  
On the 14
th
 of January 2011, the Tunisian president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali fled into exile after 
mass demonstrations had ousted the dictator, initiating what is now known as the Arab Spring. In 
Egypt, as copycat self-immolations – the Tunisian uprising was sparked by Mohamed Bouazizi’s 
self-immolation – had begun, the Youth of April 6 and We Are All Khaled Said started calling for 
mass demonstrations. Both online and in the streets, they announced a Day of Rage on January 25
th
 
– the day commemorating the Egyptian police that had resisted the British fifty-nine years earlier. 
Tens of thousands joined the demonstrations. The protesters demanded Minister of Interior al-
Adly’s resignation, removal of the Emergency Law, a minimum wage of 1,200 Egyptian pounds, a 
two-term limit on the presidency and dissolution of the current parliament. After only a couple of 
days of protests, the opposition had overwhelmed the Ministry of Interior’s forces, which withdrew 
after clashes with soccer hooligans amongst others. The protesters had managed to overcome the 
security forces and this gave them a renewed sense of importance, at this point they demanded 
Mubarak’s resignation and would not go home before that was realized (Hashim, 2011b: 115-116). 
After a failing to disrupt the opposition, by disabling internet access and text messaging, Mubarak 
made a televised appearance. Mubarak had hoped to stabilize the situation by conceding that he 
would dismiss the cabinet, but it did not help as he did not resign, which had become the 
opposition’s main demand. The following day Mubarak appointed Omar Soleiman – head of the 
General Intelligence Service (GIS) – to the previously vacant position of vice-president. The move 
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was regarded as an attempt by Mubarak to hand over some powers to Soleiman while receding into 
the background. In the mean time, the military had moved in to fill the void left by the Ministry of 
Interior, and on the 31
st
 of January, Mubarak replaced his cabinet with a cabinet of military men, 
headed by Lieutenant General Ahmed Shafiq as Prime Minister (Black, Shenker & McGreal, 2011).  
In a second televised appearance, Mubarak made another partial concession, he would complete his 
term in office – due to end in September of that year – and he would not run for the next 
presidential election. During the remainder of his term, he pledged to oversee constitutional 
amendments that would open presidential elections and establish term limits. However, any 
goodwill his speech had garnered vanished the following day when thugs on horseback and 
camelback stampeded into Tahrir (Liberation) Square, attacking protesters. Following that incident, 
Shafiq tried unconvincingly to assure that the assailants would be held accountable, but it was too 
late, the attacks had exasperated the public, strengthening the activists’ resolve to outlast Mubarak 
(Shehata, 2011: 31).   
On February 7
th
, Wael Ghonim, organizer of the We Are All Khaled Said group, made a televised 
appearance after being held in detention for ten days. In a tearful appearance he recounted his story 
and reminded the public that the security state was still intact. After the interview, the real estate tax 
collectors’ union and three other labor organizations coalesced with the political activists and called 
for strikes supporting Mubarak’s resignation. This had an immense effect as tens of thousands of 
workers in textiles, military production, transportation, petroleum, cement, iron and steel, hospitals, 
universities, telecommunications, and the Suez Canal then took part in the protests (Brownlee, 
2012: 149). 
By February 10
th
, millions of Egyptians all over the country were demonstrating. The military had 
given the presidential institution a chance to manage events. But as Mubarak and Soleiman were 
incapable of responding to the events, the military had to decide whether to remain aligned with the 
regime or not. Later that day, the SCAF, consisting of Egypt’s top twenty military officers, held a 
meeting without Mubarak – as president, Mubarak was the supreme commander of the armed 
forces. In their first communiqué, SCAF announced that they would remain in session indefinitely, 
and take appropriate measures to safeguard the nation and the achievements of the Egyptian people 
(Barany, 2011: 28) 
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On the 11
th
 of February, SCAF issued their second communiqué, pledging to end the state of 
emergency, propose constitutional amendments that would open candidacy requirements, and 
execute clean and free presidential elections. Later that day, Soleiman spoke on national television 
and announced that Mubarak had relinquished the office of the presidency and empowered the 
SCAF with administering the country’s affairs. SCAF then issued their third communiqué where 
they saluted the martyrs of the uprising and stated that legitimacy lay with the people and that they 
would soon announce the steps to come (Lutterbeck, 2013: 38).  
 
Discussion of the level of political culture during Mubarak’s presidency 
The political culture during Mubarak’s presidency can be characterized as being low i.e. public 
attachment to political institutions is limited, the public is weakly organized and disputes arise in 
relation to the institutions and procedures of the regime (Finer, 2006: 89). One day after Sadat was 
assassinated in 1981; Vice-president Mubarak was nominated for the presidency by parliament. He 
also had support in the military, as he was a retired air force commander. For twenty-nine years the 
Egyptian political system continued to be dominated by Mubarak. By controlling parliament, 
Mubarak was nominated for the presidency every six years. Presidential referenda results showed 
overwhelming votes in favor of Mubarak. These results allowed Mubarak to claim formally 
absolute legal legitimacy, but were largely regarded as false plebiscites. In addition, the 2005 
constitutional amendments, which were meant to introduce multi-party presidential elections, made 
it almost impossible for opposition figures to challenge the incumbent president, due to a long list 
of restrictions. These examples indicate a lack of widespread public approval for the procedures for 
the transfer of power. Furthermore, the riots, protests, demonstrations and assassinations executed 
by the CSF in 1986, militant Islamists during the 1980’s and the 1990’s, the Kefaya movement in 
2004, the Youth of April 6
th
 in 2008, and the National Coalition for Change in 2009, were all 
indications of a lack of widespread public involvement and attachment to civil institutions. 
Due to a powerful Ministry of Interior, commanding over a million police officers and an extensive 
set of Emergency Laws, the Egyptian public was not well mobilized into private associations which 
could influence policy outcomes. Furthermore, widespread use of military courts, false plebiscites, 
violent government controlled legislative elections, the hereditary succession plan, demonstrations 
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from a variety of societal groups, and the 2011 uprising all indicate that the ruler’s claim to govern 
and be obeyed was generally not accepted. 
 
4.3.2 Informal institutions 
During the first decade of Mubarak’s rule the military remained loyal under Abu Ghazala, who 
served as Minister of Defense in the period 1981-1989. Other ministers, such as prime ministers and 
ministers of interior were not as durable and were constantly replaced. Despite a considerable 
increase in freedom of expression in the Egyptian political system, through parliament, the press 
and the mosque, the regime under Mubarak relied heavily on the military and the CSF to limit this 
freedom (Yapp, 1996: 453). As one observer wrote, after the failed assassination attempt on 
Mubarak during an official visit to Addis Ababa in 1995, ‘’one of the many truths about Egypt that 
the assassination attempt underlined to its people was that, 43 years after the army coup toppled 
the monarchy and turned the country into a republic, the military and police security forces are still 
the final arbiters of power’’ (Ibrahim 1995, in Kechichian & Nazimek, 1997: 136) 
By 1989, Mubarak had grown impatient with Abu Ghazala’s independence and prominence and 
replaced him with Youssef Sabri Abu Taleb. After a brief period in the post as minister of defense, 
Taleb was replaced by the non-threatening figure, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, who 
remained in the post until the regime collapsed in 2011 (Nassif, 2013: 515). This was part of 
Mubarak’s plan to continue the depolitization of the military, which had begun after the 1967 War. 
In order to limit the military’s political role and assure their allegiance with the regime, Mubarak 
offered the military some privileges. As one observer notes: ‘’To ensure the continued support of 
the military for his regime, Mubarak has successfully managed, so far, to preserve uninterrupted 
access to advanced weapons, training and other benefits that come mainly from the United States – 
thus guaranteeing that the army has a ‘direct stake in both his rule and the relationship to the US 
which means inevitably a continued flow of advanced weaponry’’ (Zaki 1995, in Blaydes, 2008: 
23). Furthermore, the military was granted autonomy to create and run a military-industrial-
business-commercial complex (MIBCC). The MIBCC was a combination of defense and non-
defense businesses, and by Mubarak’s era, the vast military-run commercial enterprise was engaged 
with food products, cement, gasoline, cars and infrastructure. Furthermore, military enterprises did 
not pay taxes, and the proceeds accruing from these businesses were shrouded in secrecy (Hashim, 
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2011b: 109). These businesses also provided lucrative post-retirement jobs for senior military 
officers. However, the MIBCC were subsidized to such an extent, that even if they appeared 
profitable on paper, these activities were an actual drain on the overall state budget, since payment 
went directly to the military and not into national accounts (Springborg, 1987: 10).   
The patron-client nature of parliamentary elections in Egypt ensured the NDP a majority in the 
People’s Assembly throughout Mubarak’s presidency. This was done through the co-optation of 
politicians, which was necessary for Mubarak, as he needed the support of two-thirds of the 
parliament in order to be re-nominated for the presidency. Kassem (1999: 24-25) argues that 
electoral politics in Egypt was structured in a highly parochial basis. Rather than vote through 
programmatic or ideological conviction, voters were more concerned with the tangible benefits they 
could receive in return for their votes. This led rival contestants to focus their campaigns on ways to 
improve the specific constituency they were competing for, which made the NDP highly attractive. 
Through NDP membership, politicians would be able to tap into state resources, in order to deliver 
the goods and services that would ensure continued electoral support. This is exemplified by the 
way in which the majority of independent contestants rushed to join the NDP once they were 
elected MP’s. However, being elected to the People’s Assembly was not intended not give 
parliamentarians the ability to participate in the formulation of public policies, rather the People’s 
Assembly functioned as a rubber stamp for the policies initiated by the president. In this context, the 
NDP acted merely as a parliamentary rally and was not an independent source of power (Yapp, 
1996: 453). Being a member of the president’s party did however bring opportunities for making 
alternative gains, such as having access to state resources and having parliamentary immunity – 
impunity from corruption (Blaydes, 2008: 1). In 2002, as Gamal Mubarak’s political career was on 
the rise, the state-business nexus became particularly strong. Gamal relied on the NDP and state and 
business cronies to build his own power base and in return he helped them infiltrate the government 
and the party. Gamal and his business cronies accumulated wealth through privatizations of state-
owned companies, doubtful business dealings, real estate, and financial breaks (bank loans, tax 
exemptions, and price incentives) (Shahin, 2012: 51).  
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Discussion of informal institutions during Mubarak’s presidency 
The socio-political patterns of interaction in the period 1981-2011 can be characterized as being 
neo-patrimonial in nature, i.e. the formal political administrative system is permeated by 
relationships of loyalty and dependence (Clapham, 1985: 48). Mubarak increasingly relied on the 
CSF and the military (mainly military courts) to eliminate or silence opposition groups. During his 
first decade in office, Abu Ghazala kept the military loyal to the president. However, Abu Ghazala 
posed a threat to Mubarak from the start of his presidency and Mubarak resented his independence 
and prominence, therefore he removed him in 1989 in a bid to de-politicize the military. Mubarak 
granted the military privileges, which ensured their continued allegiance to the regime, such as 
continued U.S. military aid and autonomy to create and run a MIBCC. 
Co-optation of politicians into the NDP, made it possible for Mubarak to maintain the support of 
two-thirds of the parliament needed to be re-nominated for the presidency. In return, the elected 
politicians got access to state patronage. Furthermore, state patronage was increasingly used by 
Gamal Mubarak and his business cronies, who accumulated wealth through corrupt practices.  
 
4.3.3 Foreign Assistance        
During the 1980’s Egypt was headed towards economic crisis. Public sector and subsidy spending 
were increasing, while oil prices collapsed, which had an effect on revenues coming from oil 
exports and the Suez Canal. Recession in donor countries meant that foreign aid decreased, while 
domestically, tax revenues plunged. Just as in the Nasser and Sadat eras, the government feared 
cutting down on subsidies and other expenditures, since there was a risk of massive revolt against 
the regime. Therefore, the government kept spending and running budget deficits, while at the same 
time a balance of payments deficit was building up. The situation was becoming unsustainable, and 
that led the Egyptian government to start negotiating with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
about a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which would provide them with credit in order to 
deal with the escalating economic crisis. In 1987, Egypt agreed to implement an IMF program 
designed to liberalize the private sector, reduce public spending and improve the functioning of 
financial markets. However, later that year the agreement collapsed with half the funds dispersed. 
Negotiations with the IMF continued, but went nowhere. Even as creditors exerted coordinated 
pressure on the Egyptian government, it seemed as if they were promising much and delivering 
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little. The reason for the delaying tactics was the concern over domestic political repercussions. The 
governments concerns were not unfounded, during the negotiations there was wide-spread 
opposition to the IMF program, followed by strikes in a number of sectors in the economy 
(Nagarajan, 2013: 29-30). By 1990, Egypt was facing bankruptcy but was saved by external events. 
Iraq had invaded Kuwait, which led the United States to launch the Gulf War. Mubarak decided to 
side with the United States and contributed 20,000 soldiers to the multinational force. Due to 
Egypt’s involvement during the Gulf War, part of her foreign debt was canceled and part was 
restructured, allowing Egypt to make much more comfortable arrangements with the IMF (Yapp, 
1996: 454).      
In 1991, the Egyptian government signed a neoliberal Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment 
Program (ERSAP) with the World Bank and IMF, which had uneven effects on the Egyptian 
economy. By 1993 the budget deficit had dropped to 4.7% of GDP, then in 1994 to 2%, while GDP 
growth increased from 2% in 1992 to 6.3% in 1998-1999. Despite strong growth figures, exports as 
a share of GDP fell from 31.2% in 1990 to 24.6% in 2000. Unemployment reached 20% by 1995, 
mainly due to a growing youth bulge, but also due to thousands of Egyptian workers returning from 
Iraq. Privatization proceeded apace during the 1990’s, but corruption permeated the Egyptian 
economy, as Mubarak used economic reform to recruit wealthy clients. Additionally, in 1998, the 
United States decided to cut down on Economic Support Funds (ESF) to Egypt and Israel. The 
Egyptian government’s share of ESF was halved from $821.5 to $411 million over the next decade. 
However, the annual $1.3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) – which after 1984 came in 
the form of grants – remained, see figure 1. Furthermore, International Military Education and 
Training (IMET) was also provided to Egyptian officers (Brownlee, 2012: 66-67). 
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Figure 1. U.S. foreign aid to Egypt 1981-2010 
 
          Source: Sharp, 2011: 18-21 
 
By the end of the 1990’s the budget deficit began to rise again, this time exceeding the level of 
1989/1990. The fundamental problems of the economy had been left unaddressed. Economic 
liberalization had not created a competitive productive economy; instead it created monopolies and 
oligopolies. As the owners of these enterprises were well connected to the regime, they found 
loopholes in the tax system, and got away with not paying taxes (Nagarajan, 2013: 33). By 2001 it 
had become apparent that the ERSAP had failed to create better infrastructure in Egypt. As 
Harrigan and El-Said note (2009: 50): ‘’the inward looking growth spurt was fuelled not by 
structural reform, productivity gains and export led growth but by expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policy and by foreign savings rather than recovery of domestic savings’’. After the 11th 
September attacks, revenues from tourism, oil exports and the Suez Canal dropped. Consequently 
GDP growth fell from 5.1% in 1999/2000 to 2.3% in 2002/03 and the budget deficit grew from 3% 
of GDP in 1998/99 to 6.1% in 2002/03. At the same time Egypt was facing a liquidity crisis, foreign 
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currency reserves fell from $22 billion in 1997 to $13.8 billion in 2002 (OECD, 2003: 123-128). 
Public faith in the government diminished in 2003 when the Egyptian pound’s fixed exchange rate 
was allowed to float, which led to rising inflation, dollarization and falling growth rates (Harrigan 
& El-Said, 2009: 68). As a result, a new government was appointed in 2004, Ahmed Nazif was 
appointed prime minister, and with him, he brought prominent businessmen and technocrats, who 
sped up the process of selling public sector companies (Nagarajan, 2013: 34). Furthermore, the 
Nazif government set out to implement economic reforms. In cooperation with both USAID and the 
IFIs trade was liberalized, taxes fell and the civil service was reformed. The reforms were 
successful in stabilizing the economy, but were ultimately stalled by the financial crisis in 2008 
(Harrigan & El-Said, 2009: 63). 
As the Nazif government continued to sell state-owned companies after 2004 and accomplished 7% 
GDP growth three years in a row, resentment from blue-collar workers was growing. The blue-
collar workers were struggling with stagnant wages and rising food prices, and they blamed the 
neoliberal policies pursued by the government. By 2006, in reaction to a broken promise by the 
Nazif government to provide a two-month salary bonus, 20,000 workers from the Misr Spinning 
and Weaving factory in the Delta town of Mahalla al-Kubra, struck for three days. Protests grew in 
frequency as the government selectively cut down on subsidies. Between 2005 and 2008 Egyptians 
experienced the price of basic foodstuffs (milk, cheese, eggs and beans) increase by 100-150%, and 
in 2006 gasoline prices rose by 30%. In 2008, workers from the Misr Spinning and Weaving, called 
for a general strike on April 6
th
, in order to advance negotiations with the management of the 
factory. By April 2
nd
, regime security forces occupied the factory. Later local leaders called off the 
strike, after a small number of concessions were granted, such as free transportation to and from 
work. However, despite the compromise reached, the dearth of bread galvanized mass 
demonstrations in Mahalla on the 6
th
 of April. The following day, as demonstrations grew, the 
Interior Ministry cracked down, arresting over three hundred people and sentencing twenty-two 
protesters to jail in emergency courts. After this incident, Nazif visited Mahalla and made more 
concessions, including a one-month wage bonus and better bread distribution (Brownlee, 2012: 
127-129). 
Despite labor strikes in Mahalla and demonstrations in Cairo and other cities, Mubarak’s advisors 
did not react as if the regime was in crisis. Rather, the growing inequality was treated as a by-
product of growth, and Mubarak refrained from taking steps to protect workers from the threats of 
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privatization and inflation. The United States also shared the regime’s confidence, as Mubarak by 
the late 2000’s commanded a security force of about 1.4 million men. Furthermore, even though 
Egypt suffered from widespread poverty (between 35-40% of the population), the U.S. Embassy in 
Cairo perceived the Egyptian government as being on the right track, since economic reform had 
been successful. As Egypt looked stable enough to the White House and therefore, did not need 
special assistance, George W. Bush cut down ESF again, this meant that Egypt would be paying the 
U.S. a larger amount back, in order to finance its debt to the United States. At the same time 
Egypt’s finances were strained by the growing trade imbalance with the United States. Between 
2006 and 2008 the trade imbalance grew from $1.74 billion to $3.66 billion (Ibid.: 129-131). 
 
Discussion of foreign assistance during Mubarak’s presidency 
Foreign assistance during Mubarak’s first decade was used to pull Egypt out of an economic crisis, 
which was necessary in order to maintain regime stability by sustaining the implicit social contact. 
As negotiations with IFIs over a SAP were headed nowhere by 1990, Egypt was saved by the first 
Gulf War. Due to Egypt’s contribution to the multinational force, half of her foreign debt was 
forgiven and the rest restructured. During the 1990’s Egypt signed on to the ERSAP and witnessed 
strong growth rates and a declining budget deficit, but at the same time exports were declining and 
unemployment was soaring. Corruption permeated the Egyptian economy and particularly the 
privatization of state-owned companies was used to attract wealthy clients to the regime. Due to the 
economic progress Egypt experienced during the 1990’s, the United States decided to cut down on 
ESF. The U.S. halved ESF over a ten year period in an agreement known as the ‘Glide Path’, while 
military aid remained at the same level ($1.3 billion) during Mubarak’s presidency.  
By the early 2000’s Egypt was again facing an economic downturn, due to falling growth rates and 
a growing budget deficit. Furthermore, the Egyptian government decided to let the Egyptian pound 
float, which led to dollarization and rising inflation. By 2004 a new government headed by Nazif, 
cooperated with USAID and IFIs and managed to stabilize the economy, and accomplished 7% 
growth, three years in a row. However, as the government selectively cut down on subsidies, 
workers protests grew in frequency culminating in the April 6
th
 2008 worker strikes. This was due 
to the implicit social contract, which was increasingly under threat as the government was not 
upholding its part of the deal. The workers protests would eventually snowball into the 2011 
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uprising, which could be attributed to the fact that the rentier state model is difficult to uphold, 
when the state is not able to provide public welfare. With the Egyptian state on the brink of 
collapse, it became a necessity for the Egyptian military to broaden the government’s representative 
function, in order to ensure domestic stability. 
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5. Conclusion 
With the research questions analyzed and discussed, what remains to be outlined is the Egyptian 
military’s prominence in Egyptian politics, which will be done by citing examples from the 
analysis. Thereafter, the political culture in Egypt will be highlighted with the purpose of discussing 
the Egyptian military’s role in the 2011 uprising and the 2013 coup that removed Morsi.     
On July 23
rd
 1952, the Free Officers successfully staged a coup that removed King Farouk, which 
was not resisted by the Egyptian people, rather it was encouraged. However, by removing the King, 
the Free Officers ushered in an era of military rule that would last until 2011, and arguably, beyond 
that. In 1952 the Free Officers managed to displace the incumbent government and installed the 
civilian government of Ali Maher. Furthermore, as the Free Officers were able to influence Maher 
to remove senior officers from the military and increase military pay, Egypt had effectively turned 
into a military regime of indirect-limited military rule. This did not last for long as Maher was 
replaced by General Mohamed Naguib a month and a half later, while the rest of the cabinet 
remained, indicating a shift to indirect-complete military rule. The Free Officers gradually involved 
themselves more in politics and by the 10
th
 of December 1952, Naguib announced that the 1923 
Constitution had been abrogated and that authority had been passed to the RCC. The RCC banned 
all political parties and declared Egypt a Republic. Furthermore, Naguib became president and 
Gamal Abdel Nasser was appointed minister of interior, while other members of the Free Officers 
took over a variety of cabinet positions, which indicates a shift to direct-military rule. By 1956 – 
after the three-year transitional period – the Free Officers had managed to institutionalize military 
rule in Egypt through the 1956 Constitution, and nominated one of their own members, Colonel 
Nasser as the president of the newly established Republic of Egypt. The RCC was dissolved and 
cabinet ministers had to drop their military titles in order for the regime to show itself civilianized, 
which indicates a shift to direct quasi-civilianized military rule. The direct quasi-civilianized 
military rule remained from 1956 until 1967, as former military officers and technocrats dominated 
the state apparatus. However, after the disastrous defeat in the 1967 War, Nasser began purging 
officers from the cabinet and in their place he placed academics and civilians. Nevertheless, the 
Egyptian military remained an integral part of the state as Egypt had fought three wars in the period 
1952-1967. Furthermore, the loss of the Sinai Peninsula during the 1967 War meant that the 
Egyptian military would eventually face another confrontation, in order to regain lost land. This 
indicates a shift towards a military regime of dual rule, as Nasser was dependent on the military on 
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one hand and civilian ministers on the other. Dual military rule remained throughout Sadat and 
Mubarak’s presidencies, as the Egyptian military acted as a political power center independent of 
the state. This made it imperative for Egyptian presidents to control or at the very least maintain the 
loyalty of the military. 
The three Egyptian presidents analyzed above, were all former military officers; when they got 
elevated to the presidency they became more and more preoccupied with the functions of 
government, which meant that they started disassociating themselves from actively commanding the 
military. The threat that the military posed to their rule was always present, the military possessed 
superior organization and arms. This is exemplified by the senior military officers’ attempt to 
remove Nasser after the 1967 War and the events that led to the ‘corrective revolution’ during 
Sadat’s presidency. Furthermore, the removal of Field Marshal Abu-Ghazala by Mubarak can be 
interpreted as a move to preempt the threat posed by the military. Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak would 
therefore, adopt strategies to control the military, albeit different ones, in order to neutralize the 
threat posed by the military. Nasser politicized the military by including senior officers in the 
decision-making process and relied on them for unquestioned support. The officer’s loyalty was 
secured by providing them with privileges, such as ministerial posts, increased military pay and a 
constant supply of advanced weaponry from the Soviet Union. However, the politicization of the 
military affected the military’s professionalism and after the 1967 War, Nasser began a de-
politicization of the military by purging senior officers from the military. The process of de-
politicization continued during Sadat’s presidency, as senior officers were constantly removed over 
disagreement with Sadat’s policies. This allowed Sadat to filter out opposition from the military and 
restore the military’s professionalism. The senior officer’s therefore came to realize that their 
careers depended on their adherence to Sadat, and they were rewarded accordingly. Sadat provided 
the officer’s with lucrative post-retirement posts and maintained a constant supply of advanced 
weaponry from the Soviet Union, and later the United States. Mubarak continued with the strategies 
of de-politicization and professionalism, and complemented them with co-optation, which led to the 
complete subordination of the military to the executive. Furthermore, in order to secure that the 
military had a stake in his rule; Mubarak granted the military autonomy to create and run a MIBCC, 
maintained a constant supply of advanced weaponry from the United States and supplied officers 
with lucrative post-retirement posts. 
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The political culture in Egypt during the period 1952-2011 can be characterized as being low, since 
there was a lack of public attachment to political institutions, the public was weakly organized, and 
disputes arose in relation to the institutions and procedures of the regime. Furthermore, the 
military’s displacement of the civilian government in 1952 and 2011 is another indicator of the low 
level of political culture. In both instances, public opinion was not resistive towards military 
intervention. However, during the 2011 uprising one could argue that the public was strongly 
organized against the regime and this provided the military with an opportunity to intervene and 
displace the government, while assuming executive powers. The political transition which was 
initiated after the 2011 uprising, led to legislative and presidential elections, under the guidance of 
the SCAF. This led to the first democratically elected civilian president in Egypt’s history. 
However, the removal of Mohamed Morsi by the military in 2013 and General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s 
intention of running for the 2014 presidential elections indicates a transition to a non-democracy. 
As Schlumberger argues, the predominant socio-political pattern of interaction (neo-
patrimonialism) is the main variable denying the process of democratization (Schlumberger, 2000: 
123). As long as the military’s interests – defense expenditures, U.S. military aid and economic 
assets – are at stake the military is expected to have a strong reaction. This is what happened during 
Morsi’s presidency; he attempted to subordinate the military, by establishing institutional changes 
that limited the military’s legal functions in matters of legislative and executive authority 
(MacFarlane, 2012, 50). Therefore, as a way of preempting the threat that Morsi posed to the 
military’s prerogatives and privileges, the military took advantage of the anti-Morsi demonstrations 
that had erupted in the summer of 2013, and removed Morsi. Therefore, instead of transitioning to a 
democracy, Egypt’s path to a non-democratic military regime seems all the more likely.  
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